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Abstract
Consider the problem of locating a public facility taking into account the agents’ pref-
erences. To construct strategy-proof social choice rules, we propose a new preference
domain that allows agents to have any single-peaked or any single-dipped preference
on the location of the facility such that the peak/dip of the preference is in her own
location. We characterize all strategy-proof rules in this general framework and study
the conditions under which this family of strategy-proof rules includes non-dictatorial
rules that have more than two alternatives in the range or that are Pareto efficient.
Finally, we characterize for some focal cases all strategy-proof and Pareto efficient
rules.
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Governments frequently decide where to locate public facilities like schools, hospitals, pris-
ons, nuclear plants, or industrial parks. In order to select a location for a particular facility,
the public decision makers have to take into account not only technical or environmental
constraints, but also the preferences of the agents that form the society: ideally, one would
like to construct a facility near the locations of the agents that consider the facility a good
but far away from those that consider it a bad. Since preferences are private information
and agents have incentives to reveal them truthfully or not depending on how their reports
are incorporated in the selection process, the objective is to construct a social choice rule
that induces agents to reveal their true preferences, a property known as strategy-proofness.
It is well-known that if preferences are unrestricted, then there are no strategy-proof rules
that have more than two alternatives in the range with the exception of the dictatorial rules
(see, Gibbard [14] and Satterthwaite [19]). Therefore, to construct non-dictatorial social
choice rules that induce truth telling, it is necessary to restrict the domain of admissible
preferences. We propose in this paper a new preference domain that fits the problem of
locating public facilities (on any subset of the real line) very naturally. In this domain,
an agent’s set of admissible preferences corresponds to all single-peaked and all single-
dipped preferences so that the peak/dip is situated in her own location. Including both
single-peaked and single-dipped preferences in the domain allows agents to express either
a positive or a negative sentiment. The necessary richness of the domain is obtained by
considering all preferences that satisfy the above-mentioned requirement.
Our main result is a characterization of all strategy-proof rules on this preference domain.
Thereby it will become clear that it is possible to escape from the Gibbard-Satterthwaite
impossibility in most instances. In particular, we will see that all strategy-proof rules share
the following common structure: (i) first, agents are only asked about their types of pref-
erences (single-peaked or single-dipped), and the answers determine one or two preselected
locations; (ii) if only one location has been preselected, then it is finally chosen; and (iii) if
two locations have been preselected, then all agents that are situated strictly between the
preselected alternatives have to indicate their ordinal preferences between them (and, in
case of indifference, their entire preferences) in order to choose the winning location. The
particular ways the preselected locations that pass to the second phase are picked and the
form in which the final location is chosen have to satisfy some monotonicity conditions.
These conditions are generally not too restrictive and leave often space for the construction
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of non-dictatorial strategy-proof rules that are also Pareto efficient. For example, one par-
ticular class of rules that is strategy-proof and Pareto efficient if the set of alternatives is
a closed interval and all agents are situated in this interval is what we call the conditional
two-step rules. One prominent member of this family is the following rule: if there are
agents that declare to have single-peaked preferences, the mean of the locations of these
agents is selected; otherwise, vote by simple majority between the two extremes.
Related literature
Our paper belongs to the literature that searches for strategy-proof social choice rules on
restricted preference domains that appear in socio-economic contexts —see, Barberà [2]
for a survey—, and relates in particular to models in which the set of feasible alternatives
can be linearly ordered; i.e., from “left” to “right” in political applications or according
to some kind of index (from “north” to “south” or from “east” to “west”) if the objective
is to find a location for some facility. In these settings, one can naturally define when an
alternative lies between two other alternatives. Using this notion, a preference is then said
to be single-peaked whenever the following two conditions are met: (a) there is a single
most preferred alternative (called the peak) and (b) if alternative x is between another
alternative y and the peak, then x is preferred to y. Similarly, a preference is single-dipped
whenever (a) there is a single worst alternative (called the dip) and (b) if alternative x is
between another alternative y and the dip, then y is preferred to x.
The domain of single-peaked preferences is discussed for the first time by Black [8, 9],
who shows that the median voter rule, which selects the median of the declared peaks, is
strategy-proof and selects the Condorcet winner. Moulin [17] and Barberà and Jackson [3]
characterize the set of all strategy-proof rules on this domain (called generalized median
voter rules). Like the median voter rule, the generalized median voter rules require agents
only to indicate their peaks and not their entire preference structures.1 In our domain,
an extreme location of the preference of each agent (her location) is already known by the
planner, but the planner is uncertain whether it is a peak or a dip. This is the reason why
this information has to be elicited in the first step of the strategy-proof mechanisms in
our domain. With respect to the domain of single-dipped preferences, Manjunath [15] and
1These original studies have triggered a lot of related research and extensions. For example, Border and
Jordan [7], Barberà, Gul, and Stacchetti [5], and Chichilnisky and Heal [11] analyze the implications of
strategy-proofness for different extensions of single-peaked preferences to multiple dimensions. A particu-
larly interesting case is the one of separable preferences, introduced by Barberà, Sonnenschein, and Zhou
[6]. Danilov [13] studies single-peaked preferences when alternatives are located on a tree, generalized by
Schummer and Vohra [20] to networks. Finally, Miyagawa [16] and, more recently, Reffgen and Svensson
[18] study the problem of locating multiple public goods.
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Barberà, Berga, and Moreno [4] show that all strategy-proof and unanimous rules have to
always select one of the two extreme feasible points. In the mechanisms characterized in our
domain, the second stage is also reduced to a voting problem between at most two different
locations, but there is a wide variety of alternatives that are potentially preselected in the
first stage (not only the extremes).
The idea of considering a domain that includes both single-peaked and single-dipped pref-
erences fits many problems of locating public facilities. Consider, for example, the case
when the local authorities have to decide where to locate a new football stadium or a dog
park. Then, one can easily imagine that many dog owners and football lovers would like to
see the facility built close to their own home, yet the associated negative externalities are
more important for other social groups. One might even argue that some facilities that are
normally associated with the domain of only single-peaked preferences or with the domain
of only single-dipped preferences may not be as clear-cut as they a priori look like: people
without children living close to a school might suffer from the traffic noise, while some
inhabitants of a town might put more emphasis on the job opportunities created by a near
construction of a nuclear power plant than on the associated long-term health risks. Since
it is not possible to include all single-peaked and all single-dipped preferences in a domain
that escapes from the Gibbard-Satterthwaite impossibility (see, Berga and Serizawa [10])2,
some further domain restriction is necessary. Two previous approaches in this direction for
the particular case in which the set of feasible locations is a closed interval are Feigenbaum
and Sethuraman [12] and Thomson [21]. The former restricts the domain in such a way
that the preferences should be cardinally determined by the distance between each location
and the peak/dip. The latter only studies the case of two agents, situated at the same
location, requiring that the first (second) agent can only have single-peaked (single-dipped)
preferences with the peak (dip) in her location. The main novelty of our study is that we
fully characterize all strategy-proof rules under the sole condition that the peak/dip of an
agent is situated in her own location.
Remainder
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the necessary
notation, definitions and some focal examples that illustrate our main insights. Section 3
develops the main structure of the strategy-proof social choice rules. Section 4 provides a
complete characterization of all strategy-proof rules. In Section 5, we first explain when this
characterized family includes non-dictatorial rules that have more than two alternatives in
2See Arribillaga and Massò [1] for an approach to assess the manipulability of different generalized
median voter rules.
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the range or that are Pareto efficient. Afterwards, we characterize for some focal cases the
rules that are Pareto efficient and strategy-proof. Finally, Section 6 concludes. All proofs
are relegated to the Appendix.
2 Notation, definitions, and focal examples
Consider a social planner that wants to locate a public facility in a point on a set T ⊆ R
of feasible locations. There is a finite group of agents N of size |N | ≥ 2. Each agent is
situated at a point on the real line. We denote the agent situated at i ∈ R by i ∈ N .3 For
the moment, we do not impose any restriction on N or T , or on the relation between these
sets.
Let Ri be the weak preference relation of agent i ∈ N on T . Formally, Ri is a complete
and transitive binary relation. The strict preference relation induced by Ri is denoted
by Pi. We then say that Ri is a single-peaked preference with peak i if for all x, y ∈ T
such that i ≥ x > y or i ≤ x < y, we have that xPi y. Similarly, Ri is a single-dipped
preference with dip i if for all x, y ∈ T such that i ≥ x > y or i ≤ x < y, we have that
y Pi x.
4 The preference domain of agent i is Ri = R+i ∪R−i , where R+i (R−i ) is the set of all
single-peaked (single-dipped) preferences with peak (dip) i. Observe that the preference
domains are personalized.
A preference profile is a set of preferences R = (Ri)i∈N . The domain of all admissible
preference profiles is denoted by R = Xi∈NRi. Let RA = Xi∈AR+i × Xj∈(N\A)R−j be the
set of preference profiles such that the agents in A ⊆ N have single-peaked and the agents
in N \ A have single-dipped preferences. Sometimes, we will write RAi to indicate R+i
whenever i ∈ A and R−i whenever i 6∈ A. Similarly, RS and R−S are the restrictions of R
to the agents in S ⊆ N and N \ S, respectively. We will write R−i instead of R−{i}.
The solution concept is a social choice rule, a function f : R → T that selects for each
preference profile R ∈ R a feasible location f(R) ∈ T . We denote the range of f by Ω
and its range in the subdomain RA by ΩA.5 We say that f is manipulable by agent i ∈ N
3This notation assumes implicitly that there is at most one agent at any point of the real line. Our
results also hold when multiple agents are situated at the same point.
4Technically speaking, these preferences only have a maximal/minimal alternative at i if i ∈ T . If i 6∈ T
and T is a compact set, the most/least preferred feasible alternative is either the closest one at i’s left or
the closest one at i’s right. If i 6∈ T and T is not compact, the most/least preferred feasible alternative
may not be well-defined.
5Obviously, Ω and ΩA depend on the particular rule f that is being employed. Since the rule in use is
always clear throughout the paper, we do not include this dependence in the notation.
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if there is a preference profile R ∈ R and an alternative preference R′i ∈ Ri such that
f(R′i, R−i)Pi f(R). Then, f is strategy-proof if it is not manipulable by any agent i ∈ N .
The social choice rule f is Pareto efficient if for all R ∈ R, there is no x ∈ T such that
xRi f(R) for all i ∈ N and xPj f(R) for some j ∈ N . Finally, f is dictatorial if there
exists an agent i ∈ N (called the dictator) such that for all R ∈ R and x ∈ Ω, f(R)Ri x.
We now present three examples of different structures of N and T and their effects on
the possibilities of constructing non-dictatorial strategy-proof social choice rules. These
examples provide some first insights about the results that will be developed in the following
sections. In the first example, each of the three agents is situated between two of the three
feasible locations and no agent is situated at a feasible location.
Example 1 Suppose that N = {3, 4, 5} and T = {1, 2, 6}. Then, each agent i ∈ N has
six possible strict preferences over T under R. If she has single-peaked preferences, her
possible strict preferences are 2Pi 1Pi 6, 2Pi 6Pi 1, or 6Pi 2Pi 1. If she has single-dipped
preferences, her possible strict preferences are 1Pi 2Pi 6, 1Pi 6Pi 2, or 6Pi 1Pi 2. Thus,
the strict preferences of R coincide with the universal strict preference domain and the
Gibbard-Satterthwaite impossibility applies.
Fortunately, Example 1 is an extreme case and mostly we are going to be able to construct
non-dictatorial strategy-proof rules. We show that for a particular case in which each agent
is either situated to the left or to the right of all feasible locations.
Example 2 Suppose that N = {1, 2, 8, 9} and T = {3, 4, 5, 6, 7}. Let the social choice rule
f be such that for all R ∈ R, f(R) = 7− |{i ∈ N : 3Pi 7}|. To select a location, this rule
starts at point 7 and moves one unit to the left for each agent of {1, 2} with single-peaked
and for each agent of {8, 9} with single-dipped preferences. It can be checked that f is
strategy-proof, Pareto efficient, non-dictatorial, and has more than two alternatives in its
range.6
In the last example, the set of feasible locations is infinite and each agent is situated at a
feasible location. Then, it is again possible to find rules that satisfy the desired properties.
6Observe that in Example 2, agents only have two admissible preferences and both are single-peaked
on the set of feasible locations with the peak in one of the extremes of the range, 3 or 7. The rule f in
this example is a generalized median voter defined by Moulin [17]: it selects the median between the tops
of the agents’ preferences and the fixed ballots 4, 5, and 6. We will see in Section 5 that if each agent is
situated weakly to the left or weakly to the right of all feasible locations, then all strategy-proof rules are
generalized median voter rules.
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Example 3 Suppose that N = {1, 2, 3} and T = [0, 4]. Consider the social choice rule f
defined through the following procedure: if the set of agents with single-peaked preferences is
non-empty, choose the mean location of these agents; otherwise, choose by simple majority
(with 4 as tie-breaker) between the extremes 0 and 4. It can be checked that f is strategy-
proof, Pareto efficient, non-dictatorial, and has more than two alternatives in its range.
Examples 1 to 3 show the importance of the structure of N and T . In Sections 3 and 4,
we analyze the general problem without making any assumption on N or T . Since in this
general analysis there is no closed-form representation of the set of strategy-proof rules,
we put in Section 5 some more structure on N and T —covering, among others, the most
natural and common cases of the literature (i.e., when T is a closed interval and N ⊂ T )—
in order to obtain particular and simpler characterizations.
3 The main structure of the strategy-proof rules
Our first result is a necessary condition on the range of f that facilitates the further
analysis. The condition states that if a social choice rule is strategy-proof, then, for a
given partition of the set of agents into types (single-peaked and single-dipped), the range
of the rule can include at most two alternatives. That is, the cardinality of the range of
the rule in the subdomain RA, |ΩA|, is at most 2 for any A ⊆ N .
Proposition 1 Suppose that f is strategy-proof. Then, for all A ⊆ N , |ΩA| ≤ 2.
Proposition 1 implies that any strategy-proof rule can be divided into two steps. In the
first step, agents have to declare only their types of preferences (single-peaked or single-
dipped) and, depending on the answers, a set of at most two locations is preselected. If one
alternative is preselected, this alternative is finally implemented. If two alternatives are
preselected, the alternative that is finally implemented has to be determined in the second
step of the procedure.7 Since ΩA contains at most two preselected locations, we indicate
by lA and hA the elements of ΩA such that lA ≤ hA. Then, NA = N ∩ (lA, hA) corresponds
to the set of agents that are situated strictly between the preselected alternatives of ΩA.
Next, we derive several conditions the second step of a strategy-proof social choice rule
has to satisfy. To do so, let fA : RA → ΩA be the binary decision function associated with
7Example 3 illustrates that there are strategy-proof social choice rules such that |ΩA| = 2 for some
A ⊆ N .
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f that chooses between lA and hA when the set of agents that declared to have single-
peaked preferences is equal to A. The next proposition shows that only the preferences
of the agents belonging to NA can affect the outcome of fA. The underlying intuition is
as follows. Since the two preselected locations are both weakly to the left or both weakly
to the right of an agent i 6∈ NA, i has the same ordinal preferences over lA and hA in all
preference profiles of RA. Hence, the binary decision function fA must be independent of
these preferences in order to guarantee the strategy-proofness of f .
Proposition 2 Suppose that f is strategy-proof. Then, for all A ⊆ N and all preference
profiles R,R′ ∈ RA such that RNA = R′NA, fA(R) = fA(R
′).
Proposition 2 implies that if lA 6= hA, then at least one agent has to be situated strictly
between the two preselected alternatives. Also, we partition NA for a given profile R ∈ RA
into three groups, depending on the ordinal preferences over the two preselected alterna-
tives: LA(R) = {i ∈ NA : lA Pi hA}, HA(R) = {i ∈ NA : hA Pi lA}, and IA(R) = {i ∈ NA :
hARi lA and lARi hA}.
Any binary decision function fA can be defined by specifying for each profile R ∈ RA,
a set of coalitions GA(R) ⊆ 2N (called lA–decisive sets) such that fA chooses lA if the
set of agents of NA that prefer lA to hA, LA(R), belongs to GA(R), and hA otherwise.
This definition incorporates irrelevant information because it only matters whether or not
LA(R) belongs to GA(R), and not which other coalitions form part of GA(R). However,
it facilitates the description of the conditions that strategy-proofness imply. To describe
these conditions, let RIA(R′) be the preferences at profile R ∈ RA of the agents belonging
to NA that are indifferent between lA and hA at profile R
′. If R′ = R, then we drop the
parenthesis and write RIA .
Definition 1 Given A ⊆ N , the binary decision function fA : RA → ΩA is called a voting
by collections of lA–decisive sets if there is a correspondence GA : RA ⇒ 2N such that for
each R ∈ RA,
fA(R) =
{
lA if LA(R) ∈ GA(R)
hA otherwise
and the following conditions are satisfied:
• GA(R) ∈ 2NA\IA(R).
• For all R′ ∈ RA such that R′IA = RIA, G
A(R′) = GA(R).
• If B ∈ GA(R) and B ⊆ C ∈ 2NA\IA(R), then C ∈ GA(R).
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• For all R′ ∈ RA and C ⊆ NA\IA(R) such that R′IA(R) = RIA and IA(R
′) = IA(R)∪C:
– If B ∩ C = ∅ and B ∪ C 6∈ GA(R), then B 6∈ GA(R′).
– If B ∈ GA(R) and B ∩ C = ∅, then B ∈ GA(R′).
• If IA(R) = ∅, then ∅ 6∈ GA(R) 6= ∅.
The first condition on the correspondence GA requires that the lA–decisive sets at a profile R
have to be subsets of NA formed by agents with strict preferences over ΩA at R. The second
condition indicates that the lA–decisive sets at R only depend on the complete preferences
of the agents belonging to IA(R). Furthermore, the lA–decisive sets at any profile have
to satisfy three intuitive monotonicity properties and a non-emptiness condition. First,
all supersets of a lA–decisive set at R are also decisive at R. Second, if a set of agents
B ∪ C cannot impose lA when only the agents of B ∪ C prefer lA to hA, then the set B
is also not able to impose lA when the agents of C switch their preferences and become
indifferent between the two preselected alternatives. Third, if a set of agents B can impose
lA when only the agents of B prefer lA to hA and the agents of the set C prefer hA to
lA, then B is also able to impose lA when the agents of C become indifferent between the
two preselected alternatives. Finally, the non-emptiness condition guarantees that each of
the preselected alternatives is implemented at least in one profile in which all agents have
strict preferences over ΩA.
Observe that the outcome of a voting by collections of lA–decisive sets at a profile depends
on (i) the complete preferences of the agents belonging to NA that are indifferent between
lA and hA, and (ii) the ordinal preferences only between lA and hA of the remaining
agents of NA. We also note that the family of voting by collections of lA–decisive sets is
almost identical to the family introduced under the same name in Manjunath [15], where
it is shown that these are the unique type of rules that are strategy-proof and unanimous
in the domain of single-dipped preferences when the two alternatives to choose from are
the extreme locations minT and maxT . The only difference is that the non-emptiness
condition of GA(R) is needed in Manjunath [15] unless IA(R) = NA and not only when
IA(R) = ∅. Our next result shows that for each A ⊆ N , the binary decision function fA
associated with any strategy-proof social choice rule f has to be a voting by collections of
lA–decisive sets.
Proposition 3 If f is strategy-proof, the family of binary decision functions {fA : RA →
ΩA}A⊆N is such that for each A ⊆ N , fA is a voting by collections of lA–decisive sets.
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Propositions 1 and 3 describe the basic structure any strategy-proof social choice rule has
to satisfy. It is summarized in the next corollary.
Corollary 1 Suppose that f is strategy-proof. Then, there is a decomposition of f into
a function ω : 2N → T 2 and a family {fA : RA → ΩA}A⊆N of votings by collections of
lA–decisive sets such that for all A ⊆ N and all preference profiles R ∈ RA, ω(A) = ΩA
and f(R) = fA(R).
4 A complete characterization of the strategy-proof
rules
To obtain a complete characterization of all strategy-proof rules, we have to derive addi-
tional necessary conditions on top of Corollary 1 in each of the two steps.
Conditions on the first step
We analyze the function ω that is applied in the first step of the two-step procedure. In
particular, we are going to explain how the preselected alternatives may change as more
agents declare to have single-peaked preferences. To do that, the next result shows, for
any agent i ∈ N and any set A ⊆ N \ {i}, how ω(A) = ΩA = {lA, hA} and ω(A ∪ {i}) =
ΩA∪{i} = {lA∪{i}, hA∪{i}} could be related.
Proposition 4 Suppose that f is strategy-proof. Then, for all A ⊂ N and all i ∈ N \ A:
• If hA ≤ i, then lA∪{i} ∈ [lA, i] and hA∪{i} ∈ [hA, i].
• If lA ≥ i, then lA∪{i} ∈ [i, lA] and hA∪{i} ∈ [i, hA].
• If i ∈ NA, then i ∈ [lA∪{i}, hA∪{i}] ⊆ [lA, hA].
• If i ∈ NA and i ∈ ΩA∪{i}, then ΩA∪{i} = {i} or ΩA∪{i} ∩ ΩA 6= ∅.
Proposition 4 establishes that for any set of agents A ⊆ N \ {i} with single-peaked pref-
erences, if agent i passes from having single-dipped to single-peaked preferences, the pre-
selected alternatives of ΩA∪{i} have to be closer to i than those in ΩA. On the one hand,
if agent i is situated weakly to the left or weakly to the right of the preselected alterna-
tives of ΩA, then each of the preselected alternatives of ΩA∪{i} has to be weakly between
the location of agent i and the corresponding preselected location of ΩA. If, on the other
hand, agent i is situated strictly between the two preselected alternatives of ΩA, then
lA ≤ lA∪{i} ≤ i and hA ≥ hA∪{i} ≥ i. That is, agent i is situated weakly between the
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preselected alternatives of ΩA∪{i}, and the preselected alternatives move weakly into the
direction of the location of agent i. Moreover, if this location i belongs to ΩA∪{i}, then
either i is the unique preselected location or the second preselected alternative already
belonged to ΩA.
Conditions on the second step
We now study additional necessary conditions that arise in the second step of the two-
step procedure. In particular, we analyze how the collections of decisive sets change as an
agent i passes from having single-dipped to single-peaked preferences so that this agent
cannot benefit from misrepresenting her preferences in some instance. That is, given some
A ⊆ N \ {i}, some profile R ∈ RA, and some R′i ∈ R+i , we compare the lA–decisive sets at
R, GA(R), with the lA∪{i}–decisive sets at R′ = (R′i, R−i) ∈ RA∪{i}, GA∪{i}(R′). We only
have to impose additional conditions if |ΩA| = |ΩA∪{i}| = 2. However, given that we are
studying the general case without any assumption on N or T , there are many possibilities
of how ΩA and ΩA∪{i} could be related, all explained in Proposition 4. We introduce four
propositions that cover all possible cases.
We start with the case in which agent i is situated strictly between the two preselected
alternatives when she declares to have single-dipped preferences (i.e., i ∈ NA) and the
set of preselected alternatives changes when i announces to have single-peaked preferences
(i.e., ΩA 6= ΩA∪{i}) in such a way that agent i is also situated strictly between lA∪{i} and
hA∪{i} (i.e., i ∈ NA∪{i}). It turns then out that agent i is a dictator at ΩA and at ΩA∪{i},
that is, the alternative selected by fA and by fA∪{i} is always weakly preferred by i to the
other alternative of ΩA or ΩA∪{i}, respectively. It is important to note that the fact of
being a dictator at ΩA or at ΩA∪{i} implies that this agent is selecting her best alternative
of this set in all profiles of RA or RA∪{i}, and not only in R or R′. Formally, given S ⊆ N ,
agent i ∈ NS is said to be a dictator at ΩS if for all profiles R ∈ RS such that i 6∈ IS(R),
B ∈ GS(R) if and only if i ∈ B.8
Proposition 5 Suppose that f is strategy-proof. Then, for all A ⊂ N and all i ∈ N \ A
such that i ∈ NA ∩NA∪{i} and ΩA 6= ΩA∪{i}, i is a dictator at ΩA and at ΩA∪{i}.
8Observe that the notion of being a dictator at ΩS is different from the notion of being a dictator
defined in Section 2. The former selects the best alternative of ΩS in all profiles of RS , while the latter
selects the best alternative of the entire range Ω in all profiles of the entire domain R. That is, if an agent
is a dictator, she is also a dictator at ΩS (whenever |ΩS | = 2), but not necessarily the other way around.
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The next proposition focuses on the situation in which ΩA∪{i} = ΩA. First, if agent i is
situated weakly to the left (respectively, right) of the two preselected locations, it has to be
“easier” (respectively, “more difficult”) to select the left alternative when agent i changes
her type of preferences from single-dipped to single-peaked. Here, “easier” (respectively,
“more difficult”) means that the set of coalitions that can impose lA∪{i} = lA when agent i
declares to have single-peaked preferences has to be a weak superset (respectively, subset)
of the set when she declares to have single-dipped preferences: GA∪{i}(R′) ⊇ GA(R) (respec-
tively, GA∪{i}(R′) ⊆ GA(R)). The idea underlying this condition is to guarantee that if the
location of ΩA = ΩA∪{i} that is situated further away of agent i was selected at R
′, then this
same location is selected at R. Second, if agent i is situated strictly between the two pres-
elected alternatives, the set of coalitions that can impose the left point of the range has to
be invariant to the type of preferences of agent i (i.e., GA∪{i}(R′) = GA(R)) whenever agent
i is not indifferent between the two preselected alternatives (i.e., i 6∈ IA(R) ∪ IA∪{i}(R′)).
Proposition 6 Suppose that f is strategy-proof. Then, for all A ⊂ N , all i ∈ N \A, and
all profiles R ∈ RA and R′ = (R′i, R−i) ∈ RA∪{i} such that ΩA = ΩA∪{i},
• GA(R) ⊆ GA∪{i}(R′) whenever i ≤ lA.
• GA∪{i}(R′) ⊆ GA(R) whenever i ≥ hA.
• GA(R) = GA∪{i}(R′) whenever i ∈ NA and i 6∈ IA(R) ∪ IA∪{i}(R′).
Next, we analyze what happens if agent i is situated weakly to the left or weakly to the
right of the alternatives of ΩA and at least one of these locations changes when agent i
changes her type of preferences from single-dipped to single-peaked (i.e., ΩA 6= ΩA∪{i}) in
such a way that (lA, hA) ∩ (lA∪{i}, hA∪{i}) is non-empty. We then find that if agent i is
situated weakly to the right (respectively, left) of the alternatives of ΩA and a coalition
B is decisive to implement the left preselected alternative when agent i declares to have
single-peaked (respectively, single-dipped) preferences, then the intersection between B
and all agents with single-dipped preferences that are situated strictly between the two
preselected alternatives is a decisive set once agent i changes her type of preferences. That
is, if, for example, i is situated weakly to the right of the alternatives of ΩA (i.e., i ≥ hA),
then the unique possibility that (lA, hA) ∩ (lA∪{i}, hA∪{i}) 6= ∅ and that ΩA 6= ΩA∪{i} is
by Proposition 4 (first point) that i ≥ hA∪{i} ≥ hA > lA∪{i} ≥ lA. For those cases, the
proposition implies that if a set of agents B is lA∪{i}–decisive at R
′ (i.e., B ∈ GA∪{i}(R′)),
then the intersection of B and the set of agents with single-dipped preferences situated
strictly between the preselected alternatives of ΩA (i.e., B ∩ (NA \A)) is lA–decisive at R
(i.e., B ∩ (NA \ A) ∈ GA(R)). The idea underlying this condition is to guarantee that if
lA∪{i} is selected at R
′, then lA is selected at R.
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Proposition 7 Suppose that f is strategy-proof. Then, for all A ⊂ N , all i ∈ N \A, and
all profiles R ∈ RA and R′ = (R′i, R−i) ∈ RA∪{i} such that ΩA 6= ΩA∪{i},
• if i ≥ hA∪{i} ≥ hA > lA∪{i} ≥ lA and B ∈ GA∪{i}(R′), then B ∩ (NA \ A) ∈ GA(R).
• if i ≤ lA∪{i} ≤ lA < hA∪{i} ≤ hA and B ∈ GA(R), then B ∩ (NA∪{i} \A) ∈ GA∪{i}(R′).
Finally, in the last case i is situated strictly between the two preselected alternatives of
ΩA but not strictly between the ones of ΩA∪{i} (i.e., i ∈ NA \ NA∪{i}). Then, we know
from Proposition 4 (fourth point) that i ∈ ΩA∪{i}. Given that |ΩA∪{i}| = 2, the other
location preselected at ΩA∪{i} is one of the locations of ΩA by Proposition 4. We then
find that if a coalition is able to impose the point different from i when agent i has single-
peaked preferences, the single-peaked agents of this coalition can impose the very same
point if agent i has single-dipped preferences and is not indifferent between lA and hA (i.e.,
i 6∈ IA(R)). That is, if, for example, ΩA∪{i} = {lA, i} and a set of agents B is lA∪{i}–decisive
at R′ (i.e., B ∈ GA∪{i}(R′)), the intersection of B and the set of agents with single-peaked
preferences (i.e., B ∩ A) is lA–decisive at R (i.e., B ∩ A ∈ GA(R)). The idea underlying
this condition is to guarantee that if lA∪{i} is selected at R
′, then this same alternative is
selected at R.
Proposition 8 Suppose that f is strategy-proof. Then, for all A ⊂ N , all i ∈ N \A, and
all profiles R ∈ RA and R′ = (R′i, R−i) ∈ RA∪{i} such that i ∈ NA \NA∪{i} and i 6∈ IA(R),
• if lA = lA∪{i} and B ∈ GA∪{i}(R′), then B ∩ A ∈ GA(R).
• if hA = hA∪{i} and B ∈ GA(R), then B ∩NA∪{i} ∩ A ∈ GA∪{i}(R′).
To summarize this set of four propositions, we provide an overview of how the cases of
Proposition 4 are covered. To do so, suppose that i = 3 and consider any set A ⊆ (N \{3})
such that both ΩA and ΩA∪{3} include two preselected alternatives. There are three cases.
1. Let 3 ∈ NA, for example ΩA = {1, 5}. Then, by the third and the fourth point of
Proposition 4, we have the following three possibilities:
i. Suppose that ΩA∪{3} = ΩA = {1, 5}. The third point of Proposition 6 applies
and the decisive coalitions do not change between R ∈ RA and R′ = (R′3, R−3) ∈
RA∪{3} whenever 3 6∈ IA(R) ∪ IA∪{3}(R′).
ii. Suppose that ΩA∪{3} 6= ΩA and 3 ∈ NA∪{3}, for example ΩA∪{3} = {1, 4}.
Proposition 5 applies and agent 3 is a dictator both at ΩA and at ΩA∪{3}.
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iii. Suppose that 3 ∈ ΩA∪{3} and ΩA ∩ ΩA∪{3} 6= ∅, for example ΩA∪{3} = {1, 3}.
Proposition 8 (first or second point depending on whether 3 is hA∪{3} or lA∪{3})
applies and the decisive coalitions are so that if 1 is selected at R′ = (R′3, R−3) ∈
RA∪{3}, then 1 is also selected at R ∈ RA.
2. Let 3 ≤ lA, for example, ΩA = {5, 7}. Then, by the second point of Proposition 4,
we have the following three possibilities:
i. Suppose that ΩA∪{3} = ΩA = {5, 7}. The first point of Proposition 6 applies
and the decisive coalitions that can implement 5 at R′ = (R′3, R−3) ∈ RA∪{3}
are a weak superset of the ones that can do that at R ∈ RA.
ii. Suppose that hA∪{3} ≤ lA, for example ΩA∪{3} = {4, 5}. None of the propositions
applies and no restrictions on the decisive coalitions are imposed.
iii. Suppose that hA∪{3} > lA, for example ΩA∪{3} = {4, 6}. The second point of
Proposition 7 applies and the decisive coalitions are such that if 5 is selected at
R ∈ RA, then 4 is selected at R′ = (R′3, R−3) ∈ RA∪{3}.
3. Let 3 ≥ hA. The possibilities implied by the first point of Proposition 4 are similar
to the case when 3 ≤ lA. Moreover, the propositions applied in each case are exactly
the same as before, but using the second point of Proposition 6 and the first point
of Proposition 7.
The characterization result
So far, we have established a set of necessary conditions for a social choice rule f to be
strategy-proof. Our main theorem shows that the union of these conditions is also sufficient.
Theorem 1 A social choice rule f is strategy-proof if and only if there is a function
ω : 2N → T 2 satisfying Proposition 4 and a family {fA : RA → ΩA}A⊆N of votings by
collections of lA–decisive sets satisfying Propositions 5 to 8 such that for all A ⊆ N and
all preference profiles R ∈ RA, ω(A) = ΩA and f(R) = fA(R).
5 Additional characterizations
The structure of the characterized family and in particular the conditions imposed by
Propositions 4 to 8 depend on the relation between N and T . In fact, there are situations,
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such as Example 1, in which all strategy-proof rules with at least three alternatives in
the range are dictatorial, leading again to the impossibility of combining the axioms of
the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem. Fortunately, Examples 2 and 3 indicate that this is
generally not the case. To characterize all situations in which we can escape from this
impossibility, we need to introduce the following notation: a set S ⊆ T is said to be full at
N if N ∩ S = ∅ and N ⊂ (minS,maxS).
Theorem 2 There is a non-dictatorial strategy-proof social choice rule f with |Ω| > 2 if
and only if there is a set S ⊆ T of size |S| = 3 that is not full at N .
A practical way of checking the condition of Theorem 2 is the following.
Corollary 2 The following statements hold.
• If |T | ≥ 5, there is a non-dictatorial strategy-proof social choice rule f with |Ω| > 2.
• If |T | = 4, there is a non-dictatorial strategy-proof social choice rule f with |Ω| > 2
if and only if T cannot be partitioned into T1 and T2 such that |T1| = |T2| = 2,
maxT1 < minN , and maxN < minT2.
• If |T | = 3, there is a non-dictatorial strategy-proof social choice rule f with |Ω| > 2
if and only if N ∩ T 6= ∅ or N 6⊂ (minT,maxT ).
One can see that if there are more than 4 alternatives, then it is always possible to find
non-dictatorial strategy-proof social choice rules that have at least three alternatives in
the range. Otherwise, it is sufficient to have an agent that is situated at a feasible location
or to the left (or right) of at least three alternatives.9 However, even if the condition in
Theorem 2 is met and there is a triple that is not full at N , it is not guaranteed that we
can construct desirable rules, because it is possible that for some N and T the addition
of Pareto efficiency to the condition of strategy-proofness leads to the dictatorial rules.
Examples 2 and 3 indicate again that this is generally not the case. Our next proposition
presents a necessary condition on T for the existence of Pareto efficient rules.
Proposition 9 Suppose T is such that there is a Pareto efficient social choice rule f .
Then, minT and maxT exist.
9If |T | = 3 and none of these conditions is satisfied, the set of strict preferences of R coincides with
the universal strict preference domain (see Example 1). Thus, R restricts the universal strict preference
domain but does not allow us to escape from the Gibbard-Satterthwaite impossibility only if |T | = 4 and
the relation between N and T is the one described in the second point of Corollary 2.
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Proposition 9 shows that independently of the locations of the agents, it is necessary that
T has a minimum and a maximum. So, we assume this from now on. Our next result
characterizes the additional conditions the relation between N and T has to satisfy in
order to be able to combine Pareto efficiency and strategy-proofness without arriving at
the dictatorial rules.10
Theorem 3 Suppose T is such that |T | > 2 and both minT and maxT exist. There is a
strategy-proof social choice rule f that is non-dictatorial and Pareto efficient if and only if
at least one of the following conditions hold:
• N 6⊂ (minT,maxT ).
• There are two agents i, j ∈ N such that i ∈ T , and both max{x ∈ T : x ≤ j} and
min{x ∈ T : x ≥ j} exist.
According to Theorem 3, there are two possibilities. The first is that at least one agent is
situated weakly to the left or weakly to the right of all feasible locations. The second is
that there are two agents i and j, one situated at a feasible location (i ∈ T ), and the other
having defined nearest feasible points weakly to her left (max{x ∈ T : x ≤ j}) and weakly
to her right (min{x ∈ T : x ≥ j}).11 Since there is no closed-form representation of all
Pareto efficient and strategy-proof rules valid for all sets N and T that satisfy at least one
of these possibilities, we consider now two focal cases that reflect two conditions that are
sufficient to guarantee possibility results.
Agents situated outside (min T, max T)
The first condition that guarantees on its own the possibility of combining Pareto efficiency
and strategy-proofness without arriving at dictatorial rules is that at least one agent is not
situated in (minT,maxT ). We are going to provide the characterization for the focal case
when N ∩ (minT,maxT ) = ∅. Observe that this framework covers situations like the one
in Example 2. Let Nl = {i ∈ N : i ≤ minT} and Nh = {i ∈ N : i ≥ maxT} be the
sets of agents situated weakly to the left and weakly to the right of all feasible locations,
respectively. Obviously, Nl ∪Nh = N .
10The result is only presented for the cases when |T | > 2 because, as it is well-known, there always exist
non-dictatorial strategy-proof rules that are Pareto efficient when |T | ≤ 2.
11Observe that this includes the possibility that j ∈ T because in that case max{x ∈ T : x ≤ j} =
min{x ∈ T : x ≥ j} = j.
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Since no agent is situated strictly between alternatives of T , only one alternative gets
preselected in the first step of the two-step rules characterized in Theorem 1. Therefore,
the range of ω becomes T instead of T 2. This implies that the characterized rules are
types-only (they only depend on the type of preferences, single-peaked or single-dipped,
of each agent). One can also observe that the preference of any agent of Nl (respectively,
Nh) with a single-dipped preference can be seen as a single-peaked preference on the set
of feasible locations with the peak at maxT (respectively, minT ). Hence, each agent only
has two admissible preferences and both are single-peaked on the set of feasible locations
with the peak in minT or in maxT . Consequently, R corresponds with a subdomain of
the single-peaked preference domain. Since all generalized median voter rules are strategy-
proof on the domain of single-peaked preferences (Moulin [17]), we know that they are
strategy-proof here as well.12 We introduce a definition of these rules in our subdomain.
Definition 2 The social choice rule f is said to be a generalized median voter rule if there
is a function π : 2N → T such that for all S ⊆ S ′ ⊆ N , π(S) ≥ π(S ′), and for all preference
profiles R ∈ R, f(R) = π(S), where S = {i ∈ N : minT Pi maxT}.13
The following theorem shows that the generalized median voter rules are the unique
strategy-proof rules whenever each agent is situated weakly to the left or weakly to the
right of all feasible alternatives. The theorem also shows that to additionally obtain Pareto
efficiency, it is necessary to require that π(N) = minT and π(∅) = maxT .14
Theorem 4 Let T be such that both minT and maxT exist and that N∩(minT,maxT ) =
∅. A social choice rule f is strategy-proof if and only if it is a generalized median voter rule.
A social choice rule f is strategy-proof and Pareto efficient if and only if it is a generalized
median voter rule with π(N) = minT and π(∅) = maxT .
Observe that the rule included in Example 2 belongs to the characterized family.
12We are very grateful to two anonymous referees who have pointed out this fact to us.
13An alternative definition of these rules would be based on Theorem 1 and, in particular, on the function
ω. A social choice rule f is a generalized median voter rule if there is a function ω : 2N → T such that
for all S ⊂ N and all i ∈ N \ S, ω(S ∪ {i}) ≥ ω(S) (respectively, ω(S ∪ {i}) ≤ ω(S)) whenever i ∈ Nh
(respectively, i ∈ Nl) and that for all A ⊆ N and all preference profiles R ∈ RA, f(R) = ω(A).
14These conditions can be expressed also in terms of the function ω of Footnote 13 by saying that
ω(Nl) = minT and ω(Nh) = maxT .
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Agents situated at feasible locations
The second condition that guarantees on its own the possibility of combining Pareto
efficiency and strategy-proofness without arriving at dictatorial rules is that there are
at least two agents situated at feasible locations. We are thus interested in the fo-
cal case when N ⊆ T . Since the cases with agents situated at the extreme locations
have been studied in the previous subsection, we assume for the sake of simplicity that
N ⊂ (minT,maxT ). This setting includes many of the natural frameworks studied in
the literature, for example, when, like in Example 3, T is a closed interval and all agents
are situated within T . Since the description of the Pareto efficient and strategy-proof
rules is still quite complex, we impose tops-onliness as an additional condition. For-
mally, a social choice rule f is tops-only if for all preference profiles R,R′ ∈ R such
that t(Ri) ≡ {x ∈ T : xRi y for all y ∈ T} = {x ∈ T : xR′i y for all y ∈ T} ≡ t(R′i) for
all i ∈ N , then f(R) = f(R′). Given that N ⊂ T ∩ (minT,maxT ), it is easy to see that
for all i ∈ N and all preferences Ri ∈ R+i and R′i ∈ R−i , we have that t(Ri) = {i} and
t(R′i) ∈ {{minT}, {maxT}, {minT,maxT}}.
Before providing a formal definition of the non-dictatorial rules that are strategy-proof and
Pareto efficient, we are going to describe their core structure intuitively. All rules of the
family ask the agents first about their type of preferences (single-peaked or single-dipped).
Then, two possibilities appear. On the one hand, if there are agents that report to have
single-peaked preferences, the selected point —which is determined via an aggregator ω
that considers only the information about the location of these agents with single-peaked
preferences— lies between the leftmost and the rightmost location of these agents. So, for
example, if the set of agents that report to have single-peaked preferences is A ∈ 2N \∅, the
rule selects a location ω(A) ∈ [minA,maxA]. On the other hand, if all agents report to
have single-dipped preferences, the outcome is one of the two extreme points of T . To take
a decision between them, agents are asked about their top alternatives (i.e., their ordinal
preferences between minT and maxT ). In particular, each rule defines a set of pairs of
coalitions G ⊆ 2N × 2N and operates as follows. If the pair of sets formed by those agents
weakly preferring minT to maxT and those strictly preferring minT to maxT belongs to
G, then minT is selected. Otherwise, maxT is selected.
Up to this core structure, it is necessary to incorporate further conditions. First, the
aggregator ω has to satisfy the following monotonicity property: for all A ∈ 2N \ ∅ and all
i ∈ N \A, ω(A) ≥ ω(A∪{i}) ≥ i (respectively, ω(A) ≤ ω(A∪{i}) ≤ i) whenever ω(A) ≥ i
(respectively, ω(A) ≤ i). Second, the set of pairs of coalitions G has to satisfy the following
monotonicity property: for all A,A′, B,B′ ⊆ N with A ⊆ A′ and B ⊆ B′, [if (A,B) ∈ G,
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then (A′, B′) ∈ G] and [if (A,B′) 6∈ G, then (A ∪ (B′ \B), B) 6∈ G]. Third, G has to satisfy
also the following efficiency property: (N,B) ∈ G for all B 6= ∅ and (A, ∅) 6∈ G for all
A 6= N .15 The formal definition of the rules is then as follows.
Definition 3 The social choice rule f is said to be a conditional two-step rule if there is a
monotone function ω : 2N \∅ → (minT,maxT ), and a set of pairs of coalitions G ⊂ 2N×2N




ω(A) ∈ [minA,maxA] if A 6= ∅
minT if A = ∅ and ({i ∈ N : minT ∈ t(Ri)}, {i ∈ N : minT = t(Ri)}) ∈ G
maxT otherwise.
The following theorem states the characterization result.
Theorem 5 Suppose that T is such that both minT and maxT exist and that N ⊂ T ∩
(minT,maxT ). A social choice rule f is strategy-proof, Pareto efficient, and tops-only if
and only if it is a conditional two-step rule.
We can see that any conditional two-step rule depends on two characteristics: the aggre-
gator ω used to choose an interior point, and the pairs of coalitions of agents G used to
choose one of the extremes. For instance, the rule proposed in Example 3 is obtained if ω
is the mean and G = {(A,B) ∈ N2 : |A| > |N \ B|}. Finally, note that one particularity
of the characterized rules is that as soon as one agent has single-peaked preferences, then
all agents with single-dipped preferences are treated as dummies.
6 Concluding remarks
In this paper, we have studied the problem of locating a public facility when the general
sentiment of each agent towards the facility (it could be considered a good or a bad)
is unknown to the planner. Since it is well-known that the preference domain cannot
accommodate simultaneously all single-peaked and all single-dipped preferences without
arriving at the Gibbard-Satterthwaite impossibility, there emerges the necessity to further
15Observe that the set G introduced here and the correspondences GA for each A ⊆ N defined in Section
3 are different concepts. However, as it can be seen in the proof of Theorem 5, G is deduced from G∅.
Similarly, although the aggregator ω in Definition 3 is not specified for the ∅ (contrary to Corollary 1),
one can observe that the preselected alternatives for that case are minT and maxT .
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restrict preferences in order to obtain a strategy-proof preference revelation mechanism.
It turns out that the public decision makers tend to know the location of the agents in
many real life applications and that it is often reasonable to assume that the peaks/dips
of the preferences are closely related with the agents’ own locations. Consequently, we
consider here the domain R when agents can have any single-peaked and any single-dipped
preference with the sole limitation that the peaks/dips correspond to the agents’ locations.
We have shown that this domain R allows for the construction of non-dictatorial strategy-
proof rules with |Ω| > 2 in most cases and we have characterized them.
The model assumes that the exact location of each agent is publicly known, yet there can
be some imprecision in the determination of agents’ locations in real-life applications. If
such an imprecision was in place and we only knew that each agent is located in a point of
an interval, we would have to work with a domain bigger than R and, therefore, we would
obtain a smaller set of strategy-proof rules. The results will depend on the quantity of the
imprecision. Two extreme cases are the following. On the one hand, if it is only known
that each agent is situated at a point of an interval that includes [minT,maxT ], then
the domain would include all single-peaked and all single-dipped preferences on the set of
feasible alternatives and, therefore, we would have the Gibbard-Satterthwaite impossibility.
On the other hand, if for each agent for whom we have imprecise information about her
location, there is no point of T inside her interval of possible locations, then all rules that
are strategy-proof on R would be strategy-proof on that domain too.
The domain R, and the associated strategy-proof rules characterized in this paper, comple-
ments the existing results for the domains of only single-peaked and of only single-dipped
preferences. The decision which of the existing domain restrictions is the appropriate and,
as a consequence, which are the correct strategy-proof rules to implement depends cru-
cially on the particular facility analyzed. If the planner expects that the facility provokes
unanimous opinions in the society, then the facility would be a public good or a public
bad and the rules characterized in the classical domains would be optimal. However, if the
public decision maker suspects that the facility can produce different opinions, the rules
derived in this paper seem to be more appropriate.
Appendix
The following concepts are used in the course of our proofs. A non-ordered pair of alter-
natives {x, y} is said to be a fixed pair for agent i if for all a, b ∈ {x, y} such that a < b,
we cannot have that a < i < b. Observe that given any type of preferences of agent i
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(single-peaked or single-dipped), if {x, y} is a fixed pair for i, then this agent has always
the same ordinal preferences over {x, y}. Similarly, the ordered pair of alternatives (x, y) is
said to be a fixed pair for agent i at RAi if for all Ri ∈ RAi , xPi y. Or, to say it differently,
(x, y) is a fixed pair for i at RAi if i ∈ A and [y < x ≤ i or y > x ≥ i], or if i 6∈ A and
[i ≤ y < x or i ≥ y > x]. We can then see that if {x, y} is a fixed pair for agent i, then
(x, y) is a fixed pair for one type of preferences and (y, x) is a fixed pair for the other type.
Finally, let Oi(A,R−i) be the option set of agent i given the preferences R−i of the other
agents and given that the set of agents with single-peaked preferences at R is equal to
A ⊆ N . That is, x ∈ Oi(A,R−i) if there is a preference profile R = (Ri, R−i) ∈ RA such
that f(R) = x.
Proof of Proposition 1
Our first lemma shows that if x and y belong to an option set of agent i, then i is situated
strictly between x and y.
Lemma 1 Suppose that f is strategy-proof. Then, for all A ⊆ N , all agents i ∈ N , all
profiles R ∈ RA, and all x, y ∈ Oi(A,R−i) such that x < y, x < i < y.
Proof: Since x, y ∈ Oi(A,R−i) by assumption, there are two preferences R′i, R′′i ∈ RAi for
agent i such that f(R′i, R−i) = x and f(R
′′
i , R−i) = y. If i ≤ x, then agent i can manipulate
f at (R′′i , R−i) via R
′
i whenever i ∈ A and at (R′i, R−i) via R′′i whenever i 6∈ A. Similarly, if
y ≤ i, then agent i can manipulate f at (R′i, R−i) via R′′i whenever i ∈ A and at (R′′i , R−i)
via R′i whenever i 6∈ A. Hence, x < i < y. 
Lemma 1 directly implies that Oi(A,R−i) contains at most two alternatives.
Corollary 3 Suppose that f is strategy-proof. Then, for all A ⊆ N , all agents i ∈ N , and
all profiles R ∈ RA, |Oi(A,R−i)| ≤ 2.
Next, we show that f always selects a maximal alternative of an agent’s option set.
Lemma 2 Suppose that f is strategy-proof. Then, for all A ⊆ N , all agents i ∈ N , all
x, y ∈ T , and all profiles R ∈ RA such that Oi(A,R−i) = {x, y} and f(R) = x, xRi y.
Proof: Suppose otherwise, that is, there is a set A ⊆ N , a profile R ∈ RA, two alternatives
x, y ∈ T , and an agent i ∈ N such that Oi(A,R−i) = {x, y}, f(R) = x, and y Pi x. Since
y ∈ Oi(A,R−i) by assumption, there is a preference R′i ∈ RAi such that f(R′i, R−i) = y.
Then, agent i manipulates f at R via R′i. 
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An essential part in the proof of the proposition is to show that if the proposition was
wrong (i.e., f is strategy-proof and |ΩA| > 2 for some A ⊆ N), then there would be a
profile R ∈ RA, and two agents i, j ∈ N with other preferences R′i ∈ RAi , R′j ∈ RAj so that
the outcomes at R, (R′i, R−i), and (R
′
j, R−j) differ. Since the formal argument is rather
lengthy, we divide this part in four lemmata. Lemma 3 establishes the desired implication,
but substituting agent j for some set of agents S, not necessarily of cardinality 1.
Lemma 3 Suppose that f is strategy-proof. Then, for all A ⊆ N such that |ΩA| > 2, there
is an agent i ∈ N , a set of agents S ⊆ N \ {i}, and three profiles R, (R′i, R−i), (R′S, R−S) ∈
RA such that f(R) 6= f(R′i, R−i) 6= f(R′S, R−S) 6= f(R).
Proof: Consider any A ⊆ N and suppose that |ΩA| > 2. Then, there are three preference
profiles R̄, R̄′, R̄′′ ∈ RA such that f(R̄) 6= f(R̄′) 6= f(R̄′′) 6= f(R̄). Let f(R̄) = x. Starting
at R̄, construct the sequence of profiles in which the preferences of all agents j ∈ N are
changed one-by-one from R̄j to R̄
′
j so that the final profile is R̄
′. Since f(R̄) 6= f(R̄′), the
outcome of the function must have changed along this sequence. Let R̂ be the profile when
the outcome is x for the last time in the sequence and let i be the next agent changing
preferences in this sequence. Then, f(R̄′i, R̂−i) 6= x and denote this distinct alternative by
y. That is, f(R̂) = x and f(R̄′i, R̂−i) = y. We consider now two cases.
• Suppose that f(R̄′′) 6= y. If f(R̄′′i , R̂−i) 6∈ {x, y}, then |Oi(A, R̂−i)| > 2 contradicting
Corollary 3. Hence, f(R̄′′i , R̂−i) ∈ {x, y} and f(R̄′′) 6∈ {x, y}. Denote S = N \ {i}.
If f(R̄′′i , R̂−i) = x, the result is obtained by defining R = (R̄
′′







S. On the other hand, if f(R̄
′′
i , R̂−i) = y, the result is obtained by defining
R = (R̄′′i , R̂−i), R
′





• Suppose that f(R̄′′) = y. Then, f(R̄′) 6∈ {x, y}. Let S = N \ {i}. Then, the result is
obtained by defining R = (R̄′i, R̂−i), R
′





This completes the proof of the lemma. 
The next lemma is needed later on.
Lemma 4 Given any A ⊆ N , suppose that there are sets V ⊂ S ⊆ N and three pro-
files R, (R′V , R−V ), (R
′
S, R−S) ∈ RA such that f(R) 6= f(R′V , R−V ) 6= f(R′S, R−S) 6=
f(R). Then, there are two subsets W1 ⊂ W2 ⊆ S and an agent i ∈ W2 \W1 such that
f(R′W1 , R−W1) 6= f(R
′
W1∪{i}, R−(W1∪{i})) 6= f(R
′
W2
, R−W2) 6= f(R′W1 , R−W1).
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Proof: Take a profile R ∈ RA, a set of agents S ⊆ N with the alternative preferences
R′S, and a set V ⊂ S such that (R′S, R−S) ∈ RA and f(R) 6= f(R′V , R−V ) 6= f(R′S, R−S) 6=
f(R). Starting at R ∈ RA, construct the sequence of profiles in which the preferences
of all agents j ∈ V are changed one-by-one from Rj to R′j so that the sequence ends at
(R′V , R−V ). Since f(R) 6= f(R′V , R−V ) by assumption, the outcome must have changed
along this sequence. So, let W1 ⊂ V be the set of agents that have changed preferences
in the sequence the last time the rule selects f(R), and let i be the next agent changing
preferences in the sequence. Then, f(R) = f(R′W1 , R−W1) 6= f(R
′
W1∪{i}, R−(W1∪{i})). If
f(R′W1∪{i}, R−(W1∪{i})) 6= f(R
′
V , R−V ), the result follows from setting W2 equal to V . If, on
the other hand, f(R′W1∪{i}, R−(W1∪{i})) = f(R
′
V , R−V ), the result follows from setting W2
equal to S. 
We show that whenever the set of agents S defined in Lemma 3 is such that |S| > 1, then
we can replicate this result with another set of agents M with lower cardinality.
Lemma 5 Suppose that f is strategy-proof and that for some A ⊆ N , there is an agent i ∈
N , a set of agents S ⊆ N\{i}, with |S| > 1, and three profiles R, (R′i, R−i), (R′S, R−S) ∈ RA
such that f(R) 6= f(R′i, R−i) 6= f(R′S, R−S) 6= f(R). Then, there exists an agent j ∈ N , a
set of agents M ⊆ N\{j}, with |M | < |S|, and three profiles R̄, (R̄′j, R̄−j), (R̄′M , R̄−M) ∈ RA
such that f(R̄) 6= f(R̄′j, R̄−j) 6= f(R̄′M , R̄−M) 6= f(R̄).
Proof: Let f(R) = x, f(R′i, R−i) = y, and f(R
′
S, R−S) = z. The proof is divided into five
steps that exhaust all possibilities.
Step 1: We prove the lemma if there is a set V ⊂ S ∪ {i}, with V 6∈ {S, {i}}, such that
f(R′V , R−V ) 6∈ {x, y}.
Consider a set V ⊂ S ∪ {i}, with V 6∈ {S, {i}}, such that f(R′V , R−V ) 6∈ {x, y}. First, if
i 6∈ V , observe that f(R) 6= f(R′i, R−i) 6= f(R′V , R−V ) 6= f(R) and that |V | < |S|. Denote
profile R by R̄, preference R′i by R̄
′




V to obtain the desired result
(with i playing the role of j and V that of M). Second, if i ∈ V , denote profile (R′i, R−i)
by R̄, preference Ri by R̄
′
i, and preferences R
′
V \{i} by R̄
′
V \{i}. Since |V \{i}| < |S|, we have
the desired result (with i playing the role of j and V \ {i} that of M).
Step 2: We prove the lemma if there is a set V ⊂ S such that f(R′V , R−V ) = y.
Consider a set V ⊂ S such that f(R′V , R−V ) = y. Observe that f(R) 6= f(R′V , R−V ) 6=
f(R′S, R−S) 6= f(R). By Lemma 4, there are two sets W1 ⊂ W2 ⊆ S and an agent
k ∈ W2 \ W1 such that f(R′W1 , R−W1) 6= f(R
′





f(R′W1 , R−W1). Denote profile (R
′
W1∪{k}, R−(W1∪{k})) by R̄, preference Rk by R̄
′
k, and pref-
erences R′(W2\W1)\{k} by R̄
′
(W2\W1)\{k}. Since |(W2 \W1) \ {k}| < |S|, we have the desired
result (with k playing the role of j and (W2 \W1) \ {k} that of M).
Step 3: We prove the lemma if f(R′V , R−V ) = x for all sets V ⊂ S and there is some set
W ⊂ S ∪ {i}, with i ∈ W 6= {i}, such that f(R′W , R−W ) = y.
Consider a set W ⊂ S ∪ {i}, where i ∈ W 6= {i}, such that f(R′W , R−W ) = y. By
assumption, f(R′V , R−V ) = x for all V ⊂ S. Then, by setting V = W \ {i}, we can see
that f(R′W\{i}, R−(W\{i})) = x. Denote (R
′







by R̄′S\(W\{i}). Since |S \ (W \ {i})| < |S|, we obtain the desired result (with i playing the
role of j and S \ (W \ {i}) that of M).
Step 4: We prove the lemma if f(R′V , R−V ) = x for all V ⊂ S ∪ {i}, with V 6∈ {S, {i}},
and f(R′S∪{i}, R−(S∪{i})) 6= x.
Consider any agent j ∈ S. By assumption, f(R′V , R−V ) = x for all V ⊂ S ∪ {i} with
V 6∈ {S, {i}}. By setting V = (S∪{i})\{j}, we can see that f(R′(S∪{i})\{j}, R−((S∪{i})\{j})) =
x. Similarly, by setting V = {i, j}, we can see that f(R′{i,j}, R−{i,j}) = x. First, if
f(R′S∪{i}, R−(S∪{i})) 6∈ {x, z}, denote (R′S∪{i}, R−(S∪{i})) by R̄, Rj by R̄′j, and Ri by R̄′i to
establish the result (with {i} playing the role of M). Second, if f(R′S∪{i}, R−(S∪{i})) = z,






S\{j}. Since |S \ {j}| < |S|, we
obtain the desired result (with S \ {j} playing the role of M).
Step 5: We prove the lemma if f(R′V , R−V ) = x for all V ⊆ S ∪ {i}, with V 6∈ {S, {i}}.
Step 5.a: We show that for all j ∈ S, Oj(A, (R′i, R−{i,j})) = {x, y} and Oj(A, (R′S\{j}, R−S)) =
{x, z}.
Consider any agent j ∈ S. By assumption, f(R′V , R−V ) = x for all V ⊆ S ∪ {i} with
V 6∈ {S, {i}}. It follows thus from setting V = {i, j} that f(R′{i,j}, R−{i,j}) = x. This,
together with f(R′i, R−i) = y, implies that {x, y} ⊆ Oj(A, (R′i, R−{i,j})). Then, by Corol-
lary 3, Oj(A, (R
′
i, R−{i,j})) = {x, y}. It also follows from setting V = S \ {j} that
f(R′S\{j}, R−(S\{j})) = x. This, together with f(R
′
S, R−S) = z, implies that {x, z} ⊆
Oj(A, (R
′
S\{j}, R−S)). Again, by Corollary 3, Oj(A, (R
′
S\{j}, R−S)) = {x, z}.
Step 5.b: We show that Oi(A,R−i) = {x, y} and Oi(A, (R′S, R−(S∪{i}))) = {x, z}.
Since f(R) = x and f(R′i, R−i) = y, we have that {x, y} ⊆ Oi(A,R−i). And, by Corol-
lary 3, Oi(A,R−i) = {x, y}. By assumption, f(R′V , R−V ) = x for all V ⊆ S ∪ {i} with
V 6∈ {S, {i}}. Then, it follows from setting V = S ∪ {i} that f(R′S∪{i}, R−(S∪{i})) = x.
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This, together with f(R′S, R−S) = z, implies that {x, z} ⊆ Oi(A, (R′S, R−(S∪{i}))). Hence,
Oi(A, (R
′
S, R−(S∪{i}))) = {x, z} again by Corollary 3.
Step 5.c: We complete the proof of Step 5.
Consider any agent j ∈ S and any preference R′′j ∈ RAj such that y P ′′j x and z P ′′j x,
which is possible by Step 5.a and Lemma 1. By Step 5.a, Oj(A, (R
′
i, R−{i,j})) = {x, y} and
Oj(A, (R
′
S\{j}, R−S)) = {x, z}. Then, by Lemma 2, f(R′′j , R′i, R−{i,j}) = y and f(R′′j , R′S\{j},




i, R−{i,j}), construct the sequence of profiles in which the
preferences of all agents l ∈ (S \ {j}) ∪ {i} are changed one-by-one (from Rl to R′l for all





profile (R′′j , R
′




S\{j}, R−S) by (R̂
′
(S\{j})∪{i}, R̂−((S\{j})∪{i})).
First, if only y and z are chosen by f along this sequence, then let W ⊂ (S \ {j}) ∪ {i}
be the set of agents that have changed preferences in the sequence the last time the rule
selects y, and let k ∈ (S ∪ {i}) \ (W ∪ {j}) be the next agent changing preferences in
the sequence. Then, f(R̂′W , R̂−W ) = y 6= z = f(R̂′W∪{k}, R̂−(W∪{k})). Thus, {y, z} ⊆
Ok(A, (R̂
′
W , R̂−(W∪{k}))). Then, by Lemma 1, we have that k is situated strictly between y
and z. However, if k 6= i, by Step 5.a and Lemma 1, we also have that k is situated strictly
between x and y, and between x and z. Clearly, this is not possible. Similarly, if k = i,
by Step 5.b and Lemma 1, we also have that i is situated strictly between x and y, and
between x and z, which again is impossible. Second, if there are at least three different
outcomes chosen by f along this sequence, then, by Lemma 4, there are two setsW1 ⊂ W2 ⊆
(S\{j})∪{i} and an agent k ∈ W2\W1 such that f(R̂′W1 , R̂−W1) 6= f(R̂
′
W1∪{k}, R̂−(W1∪{k})) 6=
f(R̂′W2 , R̂−W2) 6= f(R̂
′
W1
, R̂−W1). Denote profile (R̂
′
W1∪{k}, R̂−(W1∪{k})) by R̄, preference R̂k




W2\(W1∪{k}). Since |W2 \ (W1 ∪ {k})| < |S|, we
obtain the desired result (with k playing the role of j and W2 \ (W1 ∪ {k}) that of M). 
Finally, we prove the desired result.
Lemma 6 Suppose that f is strategy-proof. Then, for all A ⊆ N such that |ΩA| > 2,
there are two agents i, j ∈ N and three profiles R, (R′i, R−i), (R′j, R−j) ∈ RA such that
f(R) 6= f(R′i, R−i) 6= f(R′j, R−j) 6= f(R).
Proof: Take any A ⊆ N such that |ΩA| > 2. By Lemma 3, there is an agent i ∈ N ,
a set of agents S ⊆ N \ {i}, and three profiles R, (R′i, R−i), (R′S, R−S) ∈ RA such that
f(R) 6= f(R′i, R−i) 6= f(R′S, R−S) 6= f(R). If |S| = 1, the proof is concluded. If |S| > 1,
apply Lemma 5 iteratively to reduce the cardinality of S to 1. 
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Now, we are ready to prove Proposition 1.
Proof of Proposition 1: Suppose that |ΩA| > 2. Then, by Lemma 6, there are three
profiles R, (R′i, R−i), (R
′
j, R−j) ∈ RA such that f(R) 6= f(R′i, R−i) 6= f(R′j, R−j) 6= f(R).
Let f(R) = x, f(R′i, R−i) = y, f(R
′
j, R−j) = z, and f(R
′
{i,j}, R−{i,j}) = w. Observe that,
although x, y and z are different, it could be that w ∈ {x, y, z}. Also, assume without loss
of generality that x < y. Next, we study the implications of the different option sets.
(1) Since {x, y} ⊆ Oi(A,R−i), Oi(A,R−i) = {x, y} by Corollary 3. Given that x < y by
assumption, Lemma 1 implies that x < i < y.
(2) Observe that {z, w} ⊆ Oi(A, (R′j, R−{i,j})). So, if w 6= z, then Oi(A, (R′j, R−{i,j})) =
{w, z} by Corollary 3 and w < i < z or z < i < w by Lemma 1.
(3) Since {x, z} ⊆ Oj(A,R−j), Oj(A,R−j) = {x, z} by Corollary 3. Then, Lemma 1
implies that x < j < z or z < j < x.
(4) Observe that {w, y} ⊆ Oj(A, (R′i, R−{i,j})). So, if w 6= y, then Oj(A, (R′i, R−{i,j})) =
{w, y} by Corollary 3 and w < j < y or y < j < w by Lemma 1.
We show that f is not strategy-proof by constructing manipulations depending on how w
relates to the other alternatives.
Case 1: Suppose that w = y. Then, y < i < z or z < i < y by (2). Suppose that (2) states
that y < i < z. Since x < i < y by (1), we have i < y < i, which is impossible. So, we
must have that (2) states that z < i < y. By (3) we have x < j < z or z < j < x. Suppose
that (3) states that z < j < x (the other case is similar and thus omitted). Then, we have
that z < j < x < i < y. The remainder of this case is divided into two parts:
• If i ∈ A, consider any preference R′′i ∈ R+i such that xP ′′i y P ′′i z. Since Oi(A,R−i) =
{x, y} by (1) and Oi(A, (R′j, R−{i,j})) = {y, z} by (2), it follows from Lemma 2 that




j, R−{i,j}) = y. Thus, {x, y} ⊆ Oj(A, (R′′i , R−{i,j})) and,
by Lemma 1, j is situated strictly between x and y. This is a contradiction because
we have already seen before that j < x < y.
• If i 6∈ A, consider any preference R′′i ∈ R−i such that z P ′′i y P ′′i x. Since Oi(A,R−i) =
{x, y} by (1) and Oi(A, (R′j, R−{i,j})) = {y, z} by (2), it follows from Lemma 2




j, R−{i,j}) = z. Thus, {y, z} ⊆ Oj(A, (R′′i , R−{i,j}))
and, by Corollary 3, Oj(A, (R
′′
i , R−{i,j})) = {y, z}. We separate the proof depending
whether j belongs to A or not.
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If j 6∈ A, consider any preference R′′j ∈ R−j such that y P ′′j z P ′′j x. Since Oj(A,R−j) =
{x, z} by (3), it follows from Lemma 2 that f(R′′j , R−j) = z. Since we also know that
Oj(A, (R
′′
i , R−{i,j})) = {y, z}, Lemma 2 also implies that f(R′′{i,j}, R−{i,j}) = y. Agent
i then manipulates f at this profile via Ri to obtain z.
If j ∈ A, consider any preference R′′j ∈ R+j such that xP ′′j z P ′′j y. Since Oj(A,R−j) =
{x, z} by (3), Lemma 2 implies that f(R′′j , R−j) = x. Given thatOj(A, (R′′i , R−{i,j})) =
{y, z}, Lemma 2 also implies that f(R′′{i,j}, R−{i,j}) = z. Given that (z, x) is a fixed
pair for i at RAi , agent i then manipulates f at (R′′j , R−j) via R′′i .
Case 2: Suppose that w = z. The proof is similar to the one above and is thus omitted.
Case 3: Suppose that w 6∈ {y, z}. By (2), we have that z < i < w or w < i < z. Suppose
that (2) states that z < i < w. Then, since j is situated strictly between x and z by (3),
and x < i by (1), we conclude that j < i. Also, observe that j is situated strictly between
y and w by (4) and that both y and w are greater than i by (1) and the assumption on
(2). Consequently, j > i, which cannot be. Thus, (2) must state that w < i < z. By (4),
we have that y < j < w or w < j < y. Suppose that (4) states that y < j < w. Given this
assumption on (4) and that x < i < y by (1), we have that x < i < y < j < w. So, i < w,
which contradicts that w < i by (2). Consequently, (4) must state that w < j < y. By
(3), we have that z < j < x or x < j < z. Suppose that (3) states that z < j < x. Then,
w < i < z < j < x by (2) and the assumption on (3), which contradicts that x < i by (1).
Consequently, (3) must state that x < j < z.
At this point, we can see that the four conditions x < i < y, w < i < z, w < j < y,
and x < j < z are indeed compatible for the moment. In fact, it turns out that x and
w are both smaller than each i and j, which are in turn both smaller than each y and z.
This implies that both {w, x} and {y, z} are fixed pairs for both agents i and j. Finally,
consider any preference R̂j ∈ RAj such that z P̂j x and y P̂j w. Since Oj(A,R−j) = {x, z}
by (3) and Oj(A, (R
′
i, R−{i,j})) = {w, y} by (4), Lemma 2 implies that f(R̂j, R−j) = z and
f(R′i, R̂j, R−{i,j}) = y. Agent i then manipulates f at (R̂j, R−j) via R
′
i when her fixed pair
at RAi is (y, z) and at (R′i, R̂j, R−{i,j}) via Ri when her fixed pair at RAi is (z, y). 
Proof of Proposition 2
We first establish the following lemma.
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Lemma 7 Suppose that f is strategy-proof. Then, for all A, S ⊆ N and all profiles
R, (R′S, R−S) ∈ RA such that f(R) 6= f(R′S, R−S), there is a set D ⊂ S and an agent
i ∈ S \D such that f(R) = f(R′D, R−D) 6= f(R′D∪{i}, R−(D∪{i})) = f(R′S, R−S).
Proof: Starting at R, construct the sequence of profiles in which the preferences of all
agents j ∈ S are changed one-by-one from Rj to R′j so that the final profile is (R′S, R−S).
Since f(R) 6= f(R′S, R−S) by assumption, the outcome of the function must have changed
along this sequence. Let D ⊂ S be the set of agents that have changed preferences in
the sequence the last time the rule selects f(R). That is, f(R′D, R−D) = f(R). Let
i ∈ S \D be the next agent changing preferences in the sequence. Then, by construction,
f(R′D∪{i}, R−(D∪{i})) 6= f(R′D, R−D). Since |ΩA| ≤ 2 by Proposition 1, it follows that
f(R) = f(R′D, R−D) 6= f(R′D∪{i}, R−(D∪{i})) = f(R′S, R−S). 
We are ready to prove the proposition.
Proof of Proposition 2: Take any A ⊆ N and suppose by contradiction that there are
two profiles R,R′ ∈ RA such that RNA = R′NA and f(R) 6= f(R
′). By Lemma 7, there
is a set D ⊂ N \ NA and an agent i ∈ (N \ NA) \ D such that f(R) = f(R′D, R−D) 6=
f(R′D∪{i}, R−(D∪{i})) = f(R
′). Thus, Oi(A, (R
′
D, R−(D∪{i}))) = ΩA by Corollary 3. Since
i 6∈ NA by construction, this contradicts Lemma 1. 
Proof of Proposition 3
Take any A ⊆ N and define, associated to f , for each profile R ∈ RA a set GA(R) ⊆
2NA\IA(R) of lA–decisive sets in the following way: B ∈ GA(R) if there is a profile R′ ∈ RA
such that R′IA = RIA , LA(R
′) = B, and f(R′) = lA. By definition, the correspondence GA
satisfies the first point of Definition 1.
Step 1: We show that for all R,R′ ∈ RA such that RIA = R′IA and LA(R) = LA(R
′), then
f(R) = f(R′).
Suppose by contradiction that for some R,R′ ∈ RA such that RIA = R′IA and LA(R) =
LA(R
′), f(R) 6= f(R′). Assume without loss of generality that f(R) = hA 6= lA = f(R′).
By Proposition 2, f(R′) = f(R′NA , R−NA). Thus, f(R) 6= f(R
′
NA
, R−NA). It follows then
from Lemma 7 that there is a set D ⊂ NA and an agent j ∈ NA \ D such that f(R) =




assumption and f(R′D, R−D) 6= f(R′D∪{j}, R−(D∪{j})), we conclude that j 6∈ IA(R)∪ IA(R′).
If j ∈ LA(R), agent j manipulates f at (R′D, R−D) via R′j. If, however, j ∈ HA(R), we
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deduce from LA(R) = LA(R
′) that j ∈ HA(R′) and j manipulates f at (R′D∪{j}, R−(D∪{j}))
via Rj. This concludes Step 1.
Step 1 guarantees that for all R,R′ ∈ RA such that RIA = R′IA , G
A(R) = GA(R′). Thus,
GA satisfies the second point of Definition 1. Similarly, Step 1 implies that for all R ∈ RA,
f(R) = lA if and only if LA(R) ∈ GA(R). Then, it only remains to be shown that GA
satisfies the last three points of Definition 1.
Step 2: If B ∈ GA(R) for some R ∈ RA, then for all j ∈ NA\(IA(R)∪B), B∪{j} ∈ GA(R).
Assume that B ∈ GA(R) for some R ∈ RA and consider any j ∈ NA \ (IA(R) ∪ B).
Suppose by contradiction that B ∪ {j} 6∈ GA(R), that is, there is no profile R̄ ∈ RA
such that R̄IA = RIA , LA(R̄) = B ∪ {j}, and f(R̄) = lA. That is, for all R̄ ∈ RA
such that R̄IA = RIA and LA(R̄) = B ∪ {j}, f(R̄) = hA. Consider one such profile
R̄ ∈ RA, together with a preference R′j ∈ RAj such that hA P ′j lA. Since (R′j, R̄−j) ∈ RA
and (R′j, R̄−j)IA = RIA , we have by the second point of Definition 1 (implied by Step 1)
that GA(R′j, R̄−j) = GA(R). Then, B ∈ GA(R′j, R̄−j). Since LA(R′j, R̄−j) = B, we obtain
that f(R′j, R̄−j) = lA. Then, agent j manipulates f at R̄ via R
′
j. This concludes Step 2.
The successive application of Step 2 implies that if B ∈ GA(R) and B ⊆ C ∈ 2NA\IA(R),
then C ∈ GA(R). Then, GA satisfies the third point of Definition 1.
Step 3: If IA(R) = ∅, then ∅ 6∈ GA(R) 6= ∅.
We will only show that if IA(R) = ∅, then NA ∈ GA(R) and, thus, GA(R) 6= ∅. The proof
that if IA(R) = ∅, then ∅ 6∈ GA(R) follows a similar reasoning.
Suppose on the contrary that NA 6∈ GA(R), that is, there is no profile R̄ ∈ RA such
that R̄IA = RIA , LA(R̄) = NA, and f(R̄) = lA. That is, for all R̄ ∈ RA such that
R̄IA = RIA and LA(R̄) = NA, f(R̄) = hA. Consider one such profile R̄ ∈ RA. Since
lA ∈ ΩA, there is a profile R′ ∈ RA such that f(R′) = lA. It follows from Proposition
2 that f(R̄) = f(R̄NA , R
′
−NA) = hA. Then, considering profiles R
′ and (R̄NA , R
′
−NA), and
applying Lemma 7, we can see that there is a set D ⊂ NA and an agent i ∈ NA \ D
such that f(R̄D, R
′





i. This concludes Step 3 and proves that GA satisfies the last
point of Definition 1.
Step 4: We show that for all profiles R,R′ ∈ RA such that R′IA(R) = RIA and IA(R
′) =
IA(R) ∪ {j} for some j ∈ NA \ IA(R), [if B ∈ GA(R) and j 6∈ B, then B ∈ GA(R′)] and [if
j 6∈ B and B ∪ {j} 6∈ GA(R), then B 6∈ GA(R′)].
29
We will only show the first implication because the other is similar. So, suppose that
R ∈ RA and j ∈ NA such that B ∈ GA(R) and j 6∈ B∪IA(R). We show that for all profiles
R′ ∈ RA such that R′IA(R) = RIA and IA(R
′) = IA(R) ∪ {j}, B ∈ GA(R′). Suppose on the
contrary that there is a profile R′ ∈ RA such that R′IA(R) = RIA , IA(R
′) = IA(R) ∪ {j},
and B 6∈ GA(R′). Then, there is no profile R̄ ∈ RA such that R̄IA = R′IA , LA(R̄) = B,
and f(R̄) = lA. That is, for all R̄ ∈ RA such that R̄IA = R′IA and LA(R̄) = B, f(R̄) =
hA. Consider one such profile R̄ ∈ RA, together with a preference R′′j ∈ RAj such that
hA P
′′
j lA. Since (R
′′
j , R̄−j) ∈ RA and (R′′j , R̄−j)IA = RIA , we have by the second point of
Definition 1 (implied by Step 1) that GA(R′′j , R̄−j) = GA(R). Then, B ∈ GA(R′′j , R̄−j).
Since LA(R
′′
j , R̄−j) = B, we obtain that f(R
′′
j , R̄−j) = lA. Then, agent j manipulates f at
(R′′j , R̄−j) via R̄j. This completes Step 4.
The successive application of Step 4 implies that for all R,R′ ∈ RA such that R′IA(R) = RIA
and IA(R
′) = IA(R) ∪ C for some C ⊆ NA \ IA(R):
• If B ∩ C = ∅ and B ∪ C 6∈ GA(R), then B 6∈ GA(R′).
• If B ∈ GA(R) and B ∩ C = ∅, then B ∈ GA(R′).
Then, GA satisfies the fourth point of Definition 1. Therefore, fA is a voting by collections
of lA–decisive sets, which concludes the proof.
Proof of Proposition 4
We first establish the following lemma.
Lemma 8 Suppose that f is strategy-proof. For all A ⊆ N and all R ∈ RA, if HA(R) =
NA (respectively, LA(R) = NA), then f(R) = hA (respectively, f(R) = lA).
Proof: Consider any R ∈ RA for some A ⊆ N . We only show that if HA(R) = NA, then
f(R) = hA (the proof of the other implication is similar). Since HA(R) = NA, we have that
LA(R) = IA(R) = ∅. Then, Proposition 3 (exactly the last point of Definition 1) implies
that ∅ 6∈ GA(R). Therefore, f(R) = hA. 
We make use of the following notation. For all A ⊆ N and R ∈ R, LA(R) = {i ∈ NA :
lA Pi hA}, HA(R) = {i ∈ NA : hA Pi lA} and IA(R) = {i ∈ NA : hARi lA and lARi hA}.
Note that the difference with the corresponding definitions in the main text are that are
applied from now on to any profile R ∈ R (not necessarily R ∈ RA).
Consider any A ⊂ N and any i ∈ N \ A.
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Step 1: If hA ≤ i (respectively, lA ≥ i), then hA∪{i} ≤ i (respectively, lA∪{i} ≥ i).
We will only consider the case when hA ≤ i because the other is similar. Suppose by
contradiction that hA∪{i} > i. Consider a profile R ∈ RA such that HA∪{i}(R) = NA∪{i}
and hA∪{i} Pi lA. Observe then that hA∪{i} Pi x for all x ∈ ΩA. If i ∈ NA∪{i}, consider any
R′i ∈ R+i with hA∪{i} P ′i lA∪{i}. Then, (R′i, R−i) ∈ RA∪{i} and HA∪{i}(R′i, R−i) = NA∪{i}.
Then, Lemma 8 implies that f(R′i, R−i) = hA∪{i} and agent i manipulates f at R via
R′i in order to obtain hA∪{i} instead of any element of ΩA. If i 6∈ NA∪{i}, consider any
R′i ∈ R+i . Again, (R′i, R−i) ∈ RA∪{i} and HA∪{i}(R′i, R−i) = NA∪{i}. Then, Lemma 8
implies that f(R′i, R−i) = hA∪{i} and agent i manipulates f at R via R
′
i in order to obtain
hA∪{i} instead of any element of ΩA.
Step 2: If hA ≤ i (respectively, lA ≥ i), then hA∪{i} ≥ hA (respectively, lA∪{i} ≤ lA).
We will only consider the case when hA ≤ i because the other is similar. Suppose by
contradiction that hA∪{i} < hA and consider the profile R ∈ RA∪{i} such that HA(R) = NA
and HA∪{i}(R) = NA∪{i}. Consider any R
′
i ∈ R−i and observe that (R′i, R−i) ∈ RA and
HA(R
′
i, R−i) = NA. By Lemma 8, f(R) = hA∪{i} and f(R
′
i, R−i) = hA. Thus, agent i
manipulates f at R via R′i.
Step 3: If i ∈ NA, then i ∈ [lA∪{i}, hA∪{i}].
We will only show that i ≤ hA∪{i} because the other implication is similar. Suppose by
contradiction that i > hA∪{i} and consider a profile R ∈ RA∪{i} such that HA(R) = NA
and hA Pi hA∪{i}. Observe then that hA Pi x for all x ∈ ΩA∪{i}. Consider any R′i ∈ R−i
with hA P
′
i lA. Then, (R
′
i, R−i) ∈ RA and HA(R′i, R−i) = NA. Then, Lemma 8 implies that
f(R′i, R−i) = hA. Thus, agent i manipulates f at R via R
′
i in order to obtain hA instead
of any element of ΩA∪{i}.
Step 4: If i ∈ NA, then lA∪{i} ≥ lA and hA∪{i} ≤ hA.
We will only show that lA∪{i} ≥ lA because the proof that hA∪{i} ≤ hA is similar. Suppose
otherwise, that is, lA∪{i} < lA. Consider a profile R ∈ RA∪{i} such that LA∪{i}(R) = NA∪{i}
and LA(R) = NA. Consider any R
′
i ∈ R−i with lA P ′i hA. Then, (R′i, R−i) ∈ RA and
LA(R
′
i, R−i) = NA. Then, Lemma 8 implies that f(R) = lA∪{i} and f(R
′
i, R−i) = lA. Thus,
agent i manipulates f at R via R′i.
Step 5: If i ∈ NA and i ∈ ΩA∪{i}, then ΩA∪{i} = {i} or ΩA ∩ ΩA∪{i} 6= ∅.
We assume without loss of generality that lA∪{i} = i and show that hA∪{i} ∈ {i, hA}.
Suppose otherwise, that is, hA∪{i} 6∈ {i, hA}. Then, by Steps 3 and 4, hA∪{i} ∈ (i, hA). Now,
31
consider a profile R ∈ RA∪{i} such that HA∪{i} = NA∪{i}, LA(R) = NA and lA Pi hA∪{i}.
Consider any R′i ∈ R−i with lA P ′i hA. Then, (R′i, R−i) ∈ RA and LA(R′i, R−i) = NA. Then,
Lemma 8 implies that f(R) = hA∪{i} and f(R
′
i, R−i) = lA. Thus, agent i manipulates f at
R via R′i.
Proof of Proposition 5
Consider any A ⊂ N and any i ∈ N \ A such that i ∈ NA ∩NA∪{i} and ΩA 6= ΩA∪{i}.
Step 1: We prove the proposition if ΩA ∩ ΩA∪{i} = ∅.
Observe that lA < lA∪{i} < i < hA∪{i} < hA by Proposition 4 (third point). We will only
show that i is a dictator at ΩA because the other implication is similar. Suppose otherwise,
that is, there is some profile R ∈ RA such that f(R) = x and y Pi x, where x, y ∈ ΩA.
Assume without loss of generality that x = hA. Then, LA(R) 6∈ GA(R). Consider a
profile R′ ∈ RA such that HA(R′) = NA \ {i}, LA∪{i}(R′) = NA∪{i}, and lA∪{i} P ′i hA.
We are going to show that f(R′) = hA. Since IA(R
′) = ∅, IA(R) = IA(R′) ∪ IA(R) and
IA(R
′) ∩ IA(R) = ∅. Then, given that LA(R) 6∈ GA(R), Proposition 3 (exactly the second
part of the fourth point of Definition 1)16 implies that LA(R) 6∈ GA(R′). Note also that
LA(R
′) ⊆ LA(R). Then, applying Proposition 3 (exactly the third point of Definition 1)
we obtain that LA(R
′) 6∈ GA(R′) and, thus, f(R′) = hA. Consider now any R′′i ∈ R+i
such that lA∪{i} P
′′




−i) ∈ RA∪{i} and LA∪{i}(R′′i , R′−i) = NA∪{i}. Then,
Lemma 8 implies that f(R′′i , R
′
−i) = lA∪{i} and agent i manipulates f at R
′ via R′′i .
Step 2: We prove the proposition if |ΩA ∩ ΩA∪{i}| = 1.
We assume without loss of generality that ΩA ∩ ΩA∪{i} = hA = hA∪{i}. Observe that
lA < lA∪{i} < i < hA∪{i} = hA by Proposition 4 (third point).
Step 2.a: We show that agent i is a dictator at ΩA if and only if agent i is a dictator at
ΩA∪{i}.
We only show that if i is a dictator at ΩA∪{i}, then i is also a dictator at ΩA (the proof of the
other implication is similar). So, suppose that i is a dictator at ΩA∪{i} but, by contradiction,
that there is some R ∈ RA such that f(R) = x and y Pi x, where x, y ∈ ΩA. Let x = hA —
the case when x = lA is similar and thus omitted— and consider a preference R
′
i ∈ R−i such
16Note that with respect to Definition 1, the roles of R and R′ are here exchanged, and that here the
role of B is played by LA(R) and that of C is played by IA(R
′) = ∅. Observe also that Definition 1
literally says that if LA(R) ∈ GA(R′), then LA(R) ∈ GA(R). But since LA(R) 6∈ GA(R), we can deduce




i hA. If it was the case that f(R
′
i, R−i) = lA, then agent i would manipulate
f at R via R′i. Hence, f(R
′
i, R−i) = hA. Since i is a dictator at ΩA∪{i} by assumption, we
also have that for all R′′i ∈ R+i with lA∪{i} P ′′i hA, i ∈ LA∪{i}(R′′i , R−i) ∈ GA∪{i}(R′′i , R−i).
Therefore, f(R′′i , R−i) = lA∪{i}. Agent i then manipulates f at (R
′






Step 2.b: We show that for all R ∈ RA with IA(R) = ∅, all R′i ∈ R+i , and all B ∈ GA(R)
with i 6∈ B, B ∩NA∪{i} ∩ A ∈ GA∪{i}(R′i, R−i).
Suppose by contradiction that there is a profile R ∈ RA, a preference R′i ∈ R+i , and a
set B ⊆ GA(R) such that IA(R) = ∅, i 6∈ B, and B ∩ NA∪{i} ∩ A 6∈ GA∪{i}(R′i, R−i).
Observe that for any j ∈ NA∪{i} ∩ A such that lA Pj hA we also have that lA∪{i} Pj hA.
Consider then a profile R̄ ∈ RA such that IA(R̄) = ∅, LA(R̄) = B, and LA∪{i}(R̄) =
B ∩ NA∪{i} ∩ A. Since i 6∈ B = LA(R̄) and IA(R̄) = ∅, hA P̄i lA. Also, R̄IA = RIA and
(R′i, R̄−i)IA∪{i} = (R
′
i, R−i)IA∪{i} . Therefore, by Proposition 3 (exactly the second point
of Definition 1), we have that GA(R̄) = GA(R) and GA∪{i}(R′i, R̄−i) = GA∪{i}(R′i, R−i).
Thus, B ∈ GA(R̄) and B ∩ NA∪{i} ∩ A 6∈ GA∪{i}(R′i, R̄−i). Given that LA(R̄) = B and
LA∪{i}(R
′
i, R̄−i) = B ∩ NA∪{i} ∩ A, we have that f(R̄) = lA and f(R′i, R̄−i) = hA. Then,
agent i manipulates f at R̄ via R′i.
Step 2.c: We show that for all R ∈ RA with IA(R) = ∅, all R′i ∈ R+i with hA P ′i lA∪{i}, and
all D ∈ GA∪{i}(R′i, R−i) with i 6∈ D, D ∩ (N \ A) ∈ GA(R).
Suppose by contradiction that there is a profile R ∈ RA, a preference R′i ∈ R+i , and a
set D ∈ GA∪{i}(R′i, R−i) such that IA(R) = ∅, hA P ′i lA∪{i}, i 6∈ D, and D ∩ (N \ A) 6∈
GA(R). Observe that for any j ∈ NA∪{i} ∩ (N \ A) such that lA∪{i} Pj hA we also have
that lA Pj hA. Consider then a profile R̄ ∈ RA such that IA(R̄) = ∅, LA∪{i}(R̄) = D, and
LA(R̄) = D∩(N \A). Then, R̄IA = RIA and (R′i, R̄−i)IA∪{i} = (R′i, R−i)IA∪{i} . Therefore, by
Proposition 3 (exactly the second point of Definition 1) we have that GA(R̄) = GA(R) and
GA∪{i}(R′i, R̄−i) = GA∪{i}(R′i, R−i). Thus, D ∈ GA∪{i}(R′i, R̄−i) and D ∩ (N \ A) 6∈ GA(R̄).
Given that LA(R̄) = D ∩ (N \ A) and LA∪{i}(R′i, R̄−i) = D, we have that f(R̄) = hA and
f(R′i, R̄−i) = lA∪{i}. Then, agent i manipulates f at (R
′
i, R̄−i) via R̄i.
Step 2.d: We show that for all R ∈ RA with IA(R) = ∅, B ∈ GA(R) if and only if i ∈ B.
Consider any R ∈ RA such that IA(R) = ∅. We only prove that if i 6∈ B, then B 6∈ GA(R)
(the converse part can be proved with similar arguments, but adapting Steps 2.b and 2.c).
Suppose by contradiction that there is B ∈ GA(R) such that i 6∈ B. Then, by Step 2.b, for
allR′i ∈ R+i , B∩NA∪{i}∩A ∈ GA∪{i}(R′i, R−i). Then, by Step 2.c (settingD = B∩NA∪{i}∩A
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and R′i ∈ R+i such that hA P ′i lA∪{i}), we obtain that (B ∩NA∪{i} ∩A) ∩ (N \A) ∈ GA(R).
However, (B ∩ NA∪{i} ∩ A) ∩ (N \ A) = ∅, contradicting Proposition 3 (exactly the last
point of Definition 1).
Step 2.e: We complete the proof of Step 2.
Consider first any R ∈ RA such that IA(R) = ∅. By Step 2.d, for all D ⊆ NA, D ∈ GA(R)
if and only if i ∈ D. Consider now any R′ ∈ RA with i 6∈ IA(R′). Since IA(R) = ∅,
IA(R
′) = IA(R) ∪ IA(R′) and IA(R) ∩ IA(R′) = ∅. Take any B ∈ 2NA\IA(R
′) with i ∈ B.
Then, B ∈ 2NA\IA(R) and, since i ∈ B, B ∈ GA(R). Then, Proposition 3 (exactly the
second part of the fourth point of Definition 1)17 implies that B ∈ GA(R′). Therefore,
B ∈ GA(R′) if and only if i ∈ B. Thus, agent i is a dictator at ΩA. Finally, by Step 2.a,
agent i is also a dictator at ΩA∪{i}.
Proof of Proposition 6
Consider any A ⊂ N and any i ∈ N \ A such that ΩA = ΩA∪{i}. Consider also any two
preference profiles R ∈ RA and R′ = (R′i, R−i) ∈ RA∪{i} such that i 6∈ IA(R)∪ IA∪{i}(R′).18
= Then, we can prove the lemma by showing that GA(R) ⊆ GA∪{i}(R′) whenever i < hA
and that GA(R) ⊇ GA∪{i}(R′) whenever i > lA. We only show the first implication because
the other is similar. Suppose by contradiction that i < hA, but there is a set C such that
C ∈ GA(R) \ GA∪{i}(R′).
First, if i 6∈ C, consider a profile R′′ ∈ RA such that R′′IA = RIA and LA(R
′′) = C. Then, by
Proposition 3 (exactly by the second point of Definition 1), GA(R′′) = GA(R) and we obtain
that f(R′′) = lA. If, on the one hand, i ≤ lA, then, (R′i, R′′−i)IA∪{i} = R′IA∪{i} . Therefore,









−i) = hA∪{i} = hA. Thus, agent i manip-




i . If, on the other hand, i ∈ NA, consider a preference R̃i ∈ R+i





and, by Proposition 3 (exactly the sec-
ond point of Definition 1), GA∪{i}(R̃i, R′′−i) = GA∪{i}(R′). Since LA∪{i}(R̃i, R′′−i) = C, we
have that f(R̃i, R
′′
−i) = hA∪{i} = hA. Thus, agent i manipulates f at R
′′ via R̃i.
Second, if i ∈ C (and, then, i ∈ NA), consider a profile R̄ ∈ RA∪{i} such that R̄IA∪{i} =
R′IA∪{i} and LA∪{i}(R̄) = C. Consider also a preference R̂i ∈ R
−
i such that lA P̂i hA. Then,
LA(R̂i, R̄−i) = C and RIA = (R̂i, R̄−i)IA . Then, by Proposition 3 (exactly the second
17Note that with respect to Definition 1, the role of C is played here by IA(R
′).
18Observe that this condition is obviously satisfied if i 6∈ NA.
34
point of Definition 1), GA∪{i}(R̄) = GA∪{i}(R′) and GA(R̂i, R̄−i) = GA(R). Therefore,
f(R̄) = hA∪{i} = hA and f(R̂i, R̄−i) = lA. Then, agent i manipulates f at R̄ via R̂i.
Proof of Proposition 7
Consider any A ⊂ N and any i ∈ N \ A such that ΩA 6= ΩA∪{i}. Consider also any two
preference profiles R ∈ RA and R′ = (R′i, R−i) ∈ RA∪{i}. We will only consider the case
when i ≥ hA∪{i} ≥ hA > lA∪{i} ≥ lA because the other is similar. Then, suppose that
B ∈ GA∪{i}(R′), but assume by contradiction that B ∩ (NA \ A) 6∈ GA(R). Observe that
for any j ∈ NA ∩ NA∪{i} ∩ (N \ A) such that lA∪{i} Pj hA∪{i} we also have that lA Pj hA.






′′) = B ∩ (NA \ A). Since (Ri, R′′−i)IA = RIA , we have by Proposition 3 (exactly
the second point of Definition 1) that GA∪{i}(R′′) = GA∪{i}(R′) and GA(Ri, R′′−i) = GA(R).
Observe that LA(Ri, R
′′
−i) = B ∩ (NA \ A). Then, f(R′′) = lA∪{i} and f(Ri, R′′−i) = hA.
Given that (hA, lA∪{i}) is a fixed pair for i at R+i , agent i manipulates f at R′′ via Ri.
Proof of Proposition 8
Consider any A ⊂ N and any i ∈ N \ A such that i ∈ NA \ NA∪{i}. Consider also any
two preference profiles R ∈ RA and R′ = (R′i, R−i) ∈ RA∪{i} such that i 6∈ IA(R). We
will only consider the case when lA = lA∪{i} because the other is similar. Suppose by
contradiction that there is some B ∈ GA∪{i}(R′), but B ∩ A 6∈ GA(R). Observe that for
any j ∈ NA ∩ NA∪{i} ∩ A such that lA∪{i} Pj hA∪{i} = i we also have that lA Pj hA. Then,
we can construct a profile R̄ ∈ RA∪{i} such that R̄IA∪{i} = R′IA∪{i} , LA∪{i}(R̄) = B, and
LA(R̄) = B ∩ A. Then, hA P̄i lA. Consider also a preference R̂i ∈ R−i such that hA P̂i lA
and observe that (R̂i, R̄−i)IA = RIA . Then, by Proposition 3 (exactly the second point of
Definition 1), GA∪{i}(R̄) = GA∪{i}(R′) and GA(R̂i, R̄−i) = GA(R). Given that LA∪{i}(R̄) =
B and LA(R̂i, R̄−i) = B ∩ A, we obtain that f(R̄) = lA∪{i} = lA and f(R̂i, R̄−i) = hA.
Thus, agent i manipulates f at R̄ via R̂i.
Proof of Theorem 1
Necessity follows from the arguments in Sections 3 and 4. For sufficiency consider any rule
f such that there is a function ω : 2N → T 2 satisfying Proposition 4 and a family {fA :
RA → ΩA}A⊆N of votings by collections of lA–decisive sets satisfying Propositions 5 to 8
such that for all A ⊆ N and all preference profiles R ∈ RA, ω(A) = ΩA and f(R) = fA(R).
Suppose by contradiction that there is a set A ⊆ N , a preference profile R ∈ RA, and
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an agent i ∈ N with the alternative preference R′i ∈ Ri such that f(R′)Pi f(R), where
R′ ≡ (R′i, R−i). Let B ∈ {A,A \ {i}, A∪{i}} be such that R′ ∈ RB. Suppose without loss
of generality that f(R) < f(R′). We divide the proof into three cases:
Case 1: Let B = A.
Observe that the assumption f(R′) > f(R) implies that f(R′) = hA Pi lA = f(R). Then,
i 6∈ LA(R) ⊆ LA(R′).
First, if i 6∈ NA, Proposition 2 implies that f(R) = f(R′) contradicting f(R′)Pi f(R).
Second, if i ∈ NA, by Proposition 3 (exactly by Definition 1), LA(R) ∈ GA(R) and LA(R′) 6∈
GA(R′). If RIA = R′IA , then we have by Proposition 3 (exactly the second point of Definition
1) that GA(R) = GA(R′). Thus, LA(R) ∈ GA(R′). Given that LA(R) ⊆ LA(R′), we can
apply Proposition 3 (exactly the third point of Definition 1) to obtain LA(R
′) ∈ GA(R′).
This is a contradiction. If, however, RIA 6= R′IA , then R
′
IA(R)
= RIA and IA(R
′) = IA(R) ∪
{i}. Then, since LA(R) ∈ GA(R) we obtain by Proposition 3 (exactly the second part of the
fourth point of Definition 1)19 that LA(R) ∈ GA(R′). Then, given that LA(R) ⊆ LA(R′),
again by Proposition 3 (exactly the third point of Definition 1), we have that LA(R
′) ∈
GA(R′). This is again a contradiction.
Case 2: Let i ∈ A and B = A \ {i}.
Suppose first that i ∈ NA. By Proposition 4 (third point), hB ≥ hA and lB ≤ lA. Hence,
i ∈ NB. Also, the assumption f(R′) > f(R) implies that f(R′) = hB.
If, on the one hand, ΩB 6= ΩA, then, by Proposition 5, i is a dictator at both ΩA and
ΩB. Since i is a dictator at ΩA, f(R)Ri hA. Given that Ri ∈ R+i , we also have that
hARi hB = f(R
′). Therefore, f(R)Ri f(R
′), which contradicts that f(R′)Pi f(R).
If, on the other hand, ΩB = ΩA, then it follows from f(R
′) > f(R) that f(R) = lA.
Consequently, by Proposition 3 (exactly by Definition 1), LA(R) ∈ GA(R) and LB(R′) 6∈
GB(R′). Also, since f(R) = lA, f(R′) = hA, and f(R′)Pi f(R), we must have that i ∈
HA(R). Thus, LA(R) ⊆ LB(R′). Observe that by Proposition 6 (third point), GA(R) =
GB(R′) whenever i 6∈ IA(R) ∪ IB(R′). By construction, i 6∈ IA(R). If i 6∈ IB(R′), then the
fact that LA(R) ∈ GA(R) implies that LA(R) ∈ GB(R′). Then, by Proposition 3 (exactly
the third point of Definition 1), LB(R
′) ∈ GB(R′). This is a contradiction. Consequently,
we have shown that for all R′′i ∈ R−i such that i 6∈ IB(R′′i , R−i), f(R′′i , R−i) = lB. Suppose
now that i ∈ IB(R′). Consider R′′i ∈ R−i such that hB P ′′i lB. Then, i 6∈ IB(R′′), where
R′′ = (R′′i , R−i) ∈ RB. By our previous finding, f(R′′) = lB. Observe also that LB(R′′) =




′). Then, by Proposition 3 (exactly by Definition 1), LB(R
′′) ∈ GB(R′′). Then,
applying Proposition 3 (exactly the second part of the fourth point of Definition 1)20, we
obtain that LB(R
′′) = LB(R
′) ∈ GB(R′). This is a contradiction.
Suppose next that i 6∈ NA. Since Ri ∈ R+i , it follows from f(R′) > f(R) and f(R′)Pi f(R)
that i ≥ hA. Then, by Proposition 4 (first point), lB ≤ lA ≤ i and hB ≤ hA ≤ i. Observe
that all this is only possible if f(R) = lA and f(R
′) = hB. Consequently, by Proposition 3
(exactly by Definition 1), LA(R) ∈ GA(R) and LB(R′) 6∈ GB(R′).
If, on the one hand, ΩA = ΩB, observe that, since i 6∈ NA, LA(R) = LB(R′). We also know
from Proposition 6 (second point) that GA(R) ⊆ GB(R′). Then, the fact that LA(R) ∈
GA(R) implies that LA(R) = LB(R′) ∈ GB(R′) and this is a contradiction.
If, on the other hand, ΩA 6= ΩB, then, by Proposition 7 (first point), LA(R) ∈ GA(R)
implies that LA(R) ∩ (NB \ A) ∈ GB(R′). Given that LA(R) ∩ (NB \ A) ⊆ LB(R′), we
obtain by Proposition 3 (exactly the third point of Definition 1) that LB(R
′) ∈ GB(R′).
This is a contradiction.
Case 3: Let i 6∈ A and B = A ∪ {i}.
Suppose first that i ∈ NA. By Proposition 4 (third point), i ≤ hB ≤ hA and i ≥ lB ≥ lA.
Also, the assumption f(R′) > f(R) implies that f(R) = lA.
First, if i ∈ NB and ΩB 6= ΩA, then, by Proposition 5, i is a dictator at both ΩA and
ΩB. Since i is a dictator at ΩA and Ri ∈ R−i , f(R) = lARi x for all x ∈ ΩB. Then,
f(R)Ri f(R
′), and this is a contradiction.
Second, if i ∈ NB and ΩB = ΩA, then the fact that f(R′) > f(R) implies that f(R′) = hB.
Then, by Proposition 3 (exactly by Definition 1), LA(R) ∈ GA(R) and LB(R′) 6∈ GB(R′).
Also, since f(R) = lA, f(R
′) = hA, and f(R
′)Pi f(R), we must have that i ∈ HA(R).
Thus, LA(R) ⊆ LB(R′). Observe that by Proposition 6 (third point), GA(R) = GB(R′)
if i 6∈ IA(R) ∪ IB(R′). By construction, i 6∈ IA(R). If i 6∈ IB(R′), then the fact that
LA(R) ∈ GA(R) implies that LA(R) ∈ GB(R′). Then, by Proposition 3 (exactly the
third point of Definition 1), LB(R
′) ∈ GB(R′). This is a contradiction. Consequently, we
have shown that for all R′′i ∈ R+i such that i 6∈ IB(R′′i , R−i), f(R′′i , R−i) = lB. Suppose
now that i ∈ IB(R′). Consider R′′i ∈ R+i such that hB P ′′i lB. Then, i 6∈ IB(R′′), where
R′′ = (R′′i , R−i) ∈ RB. By our previous finding, f(R′′) = lB. Observe also that LB(R′′) =
LB(R
′). Then, by Proposition 3 (exactly by Definition 1), LB(R
′′) ∈ GB(R′′). Then,





applying Proposition 3 (exactly the second part of the fourth point of Definition 1)21, we
obtain that LB(R
′′) = LB(R
′) ∈ GB(R′). This is a contradiction.
Third, if i 6∈ NB, then, by Proposition 4 (fourth point), ΩB = {{i}, {lA, i}, {i, hA}}. Given
that f(R′)Pi f(R) = lA and that Ri ∈ R−i , the only possibility is that ΩB = {i, hA}
and f(R′) = hA. Then, by Proposition 3 (exactly by Definition 1), LA(R) ∈ GA(R) and
LB(R
′) 6∈ GB(R′). Also, since f(R) = lA, f(R′) = hA, and f(R′)Pi f(R), we must have that
i ∈ HA(R). Thus, LA(R) ⊆ LB(R′). Given that LA(R) ∈ GA(R), we have by Proposition
8 (second point) that LA(R) ∩ NB ∩ A ∈ GB(R′). Since LA(R) ∩ NB ∩ A ⊆ LB(R′), we
obtain by Proposition 3 (exactly the third point of Definition 1) that LB(R
′) ∈ GB(R′).
This is a contradiction.
Suppose next that i 6∈ NA. Since Ri ∈ R−i , it follows from f(R′) > f(R) and f(R′)Pi f(R)
that i ≤ lA. Then, by Proposition 4 (second point), i ≤ lB ≤ lA and i ≤ hB ≤ hA. Observe
that all this is only possible if f(R) = lA and f(R
′) = hB. Consequently, by Proposition 3
(exactly by Definition 1), LA(R) ∈ GA(R) and LB(R′) 6∈ GB(R′).
If, on the one hand, ΩA = ΩB, observe that, since i 6∈ NA, LA(R) = LB(R′). We also know
from Proposition 6 (first point) that GA(R) ⊆ GB(R′). Then, the fact that LA(R) ∈ GA(R)
implies that LA(R) = LB(R
′) ∈ GB(R′) and this is a contradiction.
If, on the other hand, ΩA 6= ΩB, then, by Proposition 7 (second point), LA(R) ∈ GA(R)
implies that LA(R) ∩ (NB \ A) ∈ GB(R′). Given that LA(R) ∩ (NB \ A) ⊆ LB(R′), we
obtain by Proposition 3 (exactly the third point of Definition 1) that LB(R
′) ∈ GB(R′).
This is a contradiction.
Proof of Theorem 2
We first establish a set of lemmas that will help us in the proofs of Theorems 2 and 3.
Lemma 9 Suppose that f is strategy-proof. For all A ⊆ N∅ such that Ω ∩ A = ∅ and
Ω{i} = Ω∅ for all i ∈ A, then ΩA = Ω∅.
Proof: The proof is by induction on the size of A. First, the result for |A| ≤ 1 holds by
assumption. So, consider now any A ⊆ N∅ such that |A| > 1, Ω{i} = Ω∅ for all i ∈ A, and
Ω ∩ A = ∅. Suppose that the lemma holds for all D ⊆ N∅ such that |D| < |A| but, by
contradiction, ΩA 6= Ω∅. Take any i, j ∈ A. Since A ⊆ N∅, we have that A \ {i} ⊆ N∅ and
A\{j} ⊆ N∅. Similarly, given that Ω∩A = ∅, we have that Ω∩(A\{i}) = Ω∩(A\{j}) = ∅.





Then, by setting D = A \ {i} and D = A \ {j}, we can apply the induction hypothesis
and it follows that ΩA\{i} = ΩA\{j} = Ω∅ 6= ΩA. Since A ⊆ NA\{i} = NA\{j} and i, j ∈ A,
we have that i, j ∈ NA\{i} = NA\{j}. Given that Ω ∩ A = ∅ by assumption, we can apply
Proposition 4 (third point) on the one hand to ΩA\{i} and ΩA and, on the other hand,
to ΩA\{j} and ΩA in order to see that i ∈ NA and j ∈ NA. Thus, i ∈ NA\{i} ∩ NA and
j ∈ NA\{j}∩NA. Next, apply Proposition 5 first to ΩA\{i} and ΩA and afterwards to ΩA\{j}
and ΩA in order to obtain that both i and j are dictators at ΩA. This is a contradiction.

Lemma 10 Suppose that f is strategy-proof. For all A ⊆ N , all i ∈ NA ∩ A, and all
j ∈ N \ (NA ∪ A) such that i is a dictator at ΩA and i ∈ NA∪{j}\{i}, then ΩA∪{j} = ΩA.
Proof: Suppose by contradiction that ΩA∪{j} 6= ΩA. Since j 6∈ NA, we can assume
without loss of generality that j ≤ lA. First, if hA∪{j} > lA, consider a profile R ∈ RA
such that IA(R) = IA∪{j}(R) = ∅ and a preference R′j ∈ R+j . By Proposition 4 (second
point), j 6∈ NA∪{j}. Given that i is a dictator at ΩA, {i} ∈ GA(R). It follows then from
Proposition 7 (second point) that {i} ∩ (NA∪{j} \ A) ∈ GA∪{j}(R′j, R−j). However, since
i ∈ A, {i}∩(NA∪{j}\A) = ∅ and, therefore, ∅ ∈ GA∪{j}(R′j, R−j). Since IA∪{j}(R′j, R−j) = ∅,
this violates Proposition 3 (exactly the last point of Definition 1). Second, if hA∪{j} ≤ lA,
it follows from i ∈ NA that lA < i and from Proposition 4 (first point) applied to ΩA∪{j}\{i}
and ΩA∪{j} that hA∪{j}\{i} ≤ hA∪{j}. Thus, hA∪{j}\{i} < i, which contradicts that i ∈
NA∪{j}\{i}. 
Lemma 11 Suppose that f is strategy-proof. For all A ⊂ N , all i, j ∈ NA such that
i 6= j 6∈ A and ΩA = ΩA∪{j}, i is a dictator at ΩA if and only if i is a dictator at ΩA∪{j}.
Proof: We show that if i is a dictator at ΩA, then i is also a dictator at ΩA∪{j} (the proof
of the other implication is similar). Suppose by contradiction that i is not a dictator at
ΩA∪{j}. Consider any R ∈ RA∪{j} such that i 6∈ IA∪{j}(R) and any B ∈ GA∪{j}(R) such
that i 6∈ B (the case where i ∈ B 6∈ GA∪{j}(R) is similar). Also, let R′j ∈ R−j and R′′j ∈ R+j
be such that j 6∈ IA(R′j, R−j) ∪ IA∪{j}(R′′j , R−j). Given that ΩA∪{j} = ΩA and j ∈ NA, we
obtain by Proposition 6 (third point) that GA(R′j, R−j) = GA∪{j}(R′′j , R−j). Since i is a
dictator at ΩA, B 6∈ GA(R′j, R−j) and B ∪ {j} 6∈ GA(R′j, R−j). Thus, B 6∈ GA∪{j}(R′′j , R−j)
and B ∪ {j} 6∈ GA∪{j}(R′′j , R−j). If j 6∈ IA∪{j}(R), then by Proposition 3 (exactly the
second point of Definition 1), GA∪{j}(R′′j , R−j) = GA∪{j}(R). Thus, B 6∈ GA∪{j}(R), which
is a contradiction. If, however, j ∈ IA∪{j}(R), it follows from B ∪ {j} 6∈ GA∪{j}(R′′j , R−j)
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and the application of Proposition 3 (exactly the first part of the fourth point of Definition
1)22 that B 6∈ GA∪{j}(R), which is a contradiction. 
Lemma 12 Suppose that f is strategy-proof. For all A,B ⊆ N and all i ∈ NA \ [(A\B)∪
(B\A)] such that i is a dictator at ΩA, [(A\B)∪(B\A)]∩Ω = ∅, and [(A\B)∪(B\A)] ⊆ NA,
then ΩB = ΩA and i is a dictator at ΩB.
Proof:
Step 1: We show that ΩA∩B = ΩA and that i is a dictator at ΩA∩B.
If A \ B = ∅, then A ∩ B = A. Thus, ΩA∩B = ΩA and agent i is a dictator at ΩA∩B. If
A \ B 6= ∅, consider any j ∈ A \ B. We show that ΩA = ΩA\{j} and that i is a dictator at
ΩA\{j}.
First, suppose by contradiction that ΩA 6= ΩA\{j}. Given that [(A \ B) ∪ (B \ A)] ⊆ NA
by assumption, j ∈ NA. We can thus apply Proposition 4 (third point) to ΩA\{j} and ΩA
to see that j ∈ NA\{j}. By Proposition 5, applied to ΩA\{j} and ΩA, j is a dictator at ΩA.
This contradicts that i is a dictator at ΩA. Then, ΩA = ΩA\{j}. Finally, note that (a)
i, j ∈ NA\{j} because i, j ∈ NA and ΩA = ΩA\{j}, (b) j 6∈ A \ {j}, (c) ΩA = ΩA\{j}, and (d)
i is a dictator at ΩA. Then, it follows from Lemma 11 that i is a dictator at ΩA\{j}.
23
The successive application of the arguments of the previous paragraph to all agents of A\B
yields that ΩA∩B = ΩA and that i is a dictator at ΩA∩B.
Step 2: We show that ΩB = ΩA∩B and that i is a dictator at ΩB.
If B \ A = ∅, then A ∩ B = B. Thus, ΩB = ΩA∩B and, by Step 1, agent i is a dictator at
ΩB. If B \ A 6= ∅, consider any j ∈ B \ A. We show that Ω(A∩B)∪{j} = ΩA∩B and that i is
a dictator at Ω(A∩B)∪{j}.
First, suppose by contradiction that Ω(A∩B)∪{j} 6= ΩA∩B. Since [(A \B)∪ (B \A)]∩Ω = ∅,
we have that j 6∈ Ω. Given that [(A \B)∪ (B \A)] ⊆ NA by assumption, j ∈ NA. We can
thus apply Proposition 4 (third point) to ΩA∩B and Ω(A∩B)∪{j} to see that j ∈ N(A∩B)∪{j}.
By Proposition 5, applied to ΩA∩B and Ω(A∩B)∪{j}, j is a dictator at ΩA∩B. This contradicts
that i is a dictator at ΩA∩B. Then, Ω(A∩B)∪{j} = ΩA∩B. Finally, note that (a) i, j ∈ NA∩B
because i, j ∈ NA and ΩA = ΩA∩B by Step 1, (b) j 6∈ A ∩ B because j ∈ B \ A, (c)
Ω(A∩B)∪{j} = ΩA∩B, and (d) i is a dictator at ΩA∩B. Then, it follows from Lemma 11 that
i is a dictator at Ω(A∩B)∪{j}.
24
22Note that with respect to Definition 1, the roles of profiles R and R′ are played here by (R′′j , R−j) and
R, respectively. Also, the role of C is played here by {j}.
23Note that with respect to Lemma 11, the role of A is played here by A \ {j}.
24Note that with respect to Lemma 11, the role of A is played here by A ∩B.
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The successive application of the arguments of the previous paragraph to all agents of B\A
yields that ΩB = ΩA∩B and that i is a dictator at ΩB. This concludes Step 2.
The joint application of Steps 1 and 2 implies that ΩA = ΩB. This concludes the proof. 
Lemma 13 Suppose that f is strategy-proof. If there exists an agent i ∈ N{i} ⊆ N∅ = N
such that Ω{i} 6= Ω∅ and (N \ {i}) ∩ Ω = ∅, then f is dictatorial.
Proof: Observe that since Ω∅ 6= Ω{i} and i ∈ N∅ ∩N{i}, we have by Proposition 5, applied
to Ω∅ and Ω{i}, that i is a dictator at Ω∅ and at Ω{i}.
Step 1: We show that for all A ⊆ N \ {i}, ΩA = Ω∅ and i is a dictator at ΩA.
Consider any A ⊆ N \ {i}. Note that (a) i ∈ N∅ \ A because by assumption N∅ = N
and i 6∈ A, (b) i is a dictator at Ω∅, (c) A ∩ Ω = ∅ because by assumption i 6∈ A and
(N \ {i}) ∩Ω = ∅, and (d) A ⊆ N∅ because N∅ = N by assumption. Then, it follows from
Lemma 12 that ΩA = Ω∅ and that i is a dictator at ΩA.
25
Step 2: We show that for all A ⊆ N with i ∈ A, ΩA = Ω{i} and i is a dictator at ΩA.
The proof is by induction on the size of A. First, let |A| = 1. Then, A = {i}. By definition,
ΩA = Ω{i} and we already know that i is a dictator at Ω{i}. So, consider now any A ⊆ N
such that i ∈ A and |A| > 1 and suppose that for all D ⊂ A such that i ∈ D, ΩD = Ω{i}
and i is a dictator at ΩD. We have to prove that ΩA = Ω{i} and that i is a dictator at ΩA.
We show first that ΩA = Ω{i}. Suppose otherwise and consider any j ∈ A \ {i}. Setting
D = A \ {j} in the induction hypothesis, we obtain that ΩA\{j} = Ω{i} and that i is a
dictator at ΩA\{j}. First, if j ∈ NA, then applying Proposition 4 (third point) to ΩA\{j}
and ΩA we obtain that j ∈ NA\{j}. Given that ΩA 6= ΩA\{j}, applying Proposition 5 to
ΩA\{j} and ΩA we obtain that j is a dictator at ΩA\{j}. This contradicts that i is a dictator
at ΩA\{j}. Second, if j 6∈ NA, note that (a) i ∈ NA\{j} ∩ (A \ {j}) because i ∈ A, i ∈ N{i}
and ΩA\{j} = Ω{i} by the induction hypothesis, (b) j 6∈ NA\{j} ∪ (A \ {j}) because by the
application of Proposition 4 (first or second point depending on whether or not j ≥ hA)
to ΩA\{j} and ΩA we obtain from j 6∈ NA that j 6∈ NA\{j}, (c) i is a dictator at ΩA\{j} by
the induction hypothesis, and (d) i ∈ NA\{i} because ΩA\{i} = Ω∅ by Step 1 and N∅ = N .
It follows from Lemma 10 that ΩA = ΩA\{j}.
26 Then, since ΩA\{j} = Ω{i}, ΩA = Ω{i}.
25Note that with respect to Lemma 12, the roles of A and B are played here by ∅ and A, respectively.
Observe also that [(∅ \A) ∪ (A \ ∅)] = A.
26Note that the role of A in Lemma 10 is played here by A \ {j}.
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We now show that i is a dictator at ΩA. Observe that since ΩA\{i} = Ω∅ by Step 1,
ΩA\{i} 6= ΩA. Since ΩA = ΩA\{j} and i is a dictator at ΩA\{j} by the induction hypothesis,
i ∈ NA. Given that i is a dictator at ΩA\{i} by Step 1, i ∈ NA\{i}. It follows then from
Proposition 5 (applied to ΩA\{i} and ΩA) that i is a dictator at ΩA.
Step 3: We show that f is a dictatorship of agent i.
We have that for all A ⊆ N , ΩA = Ω{i} whenever i ∈ A by Step 2 and ΩA = Ω∅ whenever
i 6∈ A by Step 1. Then, Ω = {l∅, l{i}, h{i}, h∅}. Also, by Steps 1 and 2, agent i is a dictator
at ΩA for all A ⊆ N . Thus, for any A ⊆ N , agent i obtains one of her maximal alternatives
of the set ΩA at any profile R ∈ RA. It remains to be shown that this maximal alternative
of the set ΩA is also one of her maximal alternatives of the entire range Ω. The application
of Proposition 4 (third point) to Ω∅ and Ω{i} implies that l∅ ≤ l{i} < i < h{i} ≤ h∅.
Then, agent i always prefers her best alternative of Ω{i} (respectively, Ω∅) to any other
alternative of Ω when she has single-peaked (respectively, single-dipped) preferences. Then,
f is dictatorial, being i the dictator. 
Lemma 14 There is no strategy-proof and non-dictatorial rule f with |Ω| > 2 and Ω full
at N .
Proof: Suppose by contradiction that there is a non-dictatorial strategy-proof rule with
|Ω| > 2 and Ω full at N . Then, N ⊂ (min Ω,max Ω) \ Ω.
Step 1: We show that Ω∅ = {min Ω,max Ω}.
We only prove that l∅ = min Ω (the proof that h∅ = max Ω is similar). Suppose by
contradiction that l∅ 6= min Ω. Since l∅ ∈ Ω, l∅ > min Ω. And since min Ω ∈ Ω, there exists
A ⊆ N such that min Ω = lA. It follows then from N ⊂ (min Ω,max Ω) \ Ω that for all
j ∈ A, j > min Ω. Then, consider any j ∈ A and apply Proposition 4 (first or third point
depending on whether or not j ≥ hA) to ΩA\{j} and ΩA to see that lA\{j} ≤ lA. First, if
A \ {j} = ∅, we obtain that l∅ ≤ min Ω, which is a contradiction. Second, if A \ {j} 6= ∅,
consider any k ∈ A \ {j} and note that, since lA\{j} ≤ lA = min Ω and k > min Ω,
k > lA\{j}. Then, apply Proposition 4 (first or third point depending on whether or not
k ≥ hA\{j}) to ΩA\{j,k} and ΩA\{j} to see that lA\{j,k} ≤ lA\{j}. Thus, lA\{j,k} ≤ min Ω.
Proceeding iteratively in this way with all agents of A, we arrive at l∅ ≤ min Ω. This is a
contradiction.
Step 2: We reach a contradiction.
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Since N ⊂ (min Ω,max Ω)\Ω and, by Step 1, Ω∅ = {minT,maxT}, we have that N∅ = N .
Suppose first that for all i ∈ N , Ω{i} = Ω∅. Consider any A ⊆ N . Note that (a) A ⊆ N∅
because N∅ = N , and (b) Ω ∩ A = ∅ because N ⊂ (min Ω,max Ω) \ Ω. By Lemma 9,
ΩA = Ω∅ for all A ⊆ N . Thus, |Ω| = 2, which is a contradiction. Suppose next that there
is an agent i ∈ N such that Ω{i} 6= Ω∅. Note that (a) i ∈ N{i} ⊆ N∅ = N because it follows
from N ⊂ (min Ω,max Ω) \ Ω and, by Step 1, Ω∅ = {min Ω,max Ω} that N∅ = N and
because the assumption i 6∈ Ω implies that we can apply Proposition 4 (third point) to Ω∅
and Ω{i} to obtain that i ∈ N{i}, and (b) (N \{i})∩Ω = ∅ because N ⊂ (min Ω,max Ω)\Ω.
It follows then from Lemma 13 that f is dictatorial, which is a contradiction. 
We are ready to prove the theorem.
⇒]: We show that if all triples of T are full at N , then Ω, |Ω| > 2, is also full at N . First,
since Ω ⊆ T , we have that for all x ∈ Ω \ {min Ω,max Ω}, {min Ω, x,max Ω} is full at N .
Then, N ⊂ (min{min Ω, x,max Ω},max{min Ω, x,max Ω}). Since min{min Ω, x,max Ω} =
min Ω and max{min Ω, x,max Ω} = max Ω, we obtain that N ⊂ (min Ω,max Ω). Second,
consider any x ∈ Ω and note that for all y, z ∈ T , {x, y, z} is full at N . Hence, x 6∈ N .
Thus, N ∩ Ω = ∅. Therefore, Ω is full at N . The result follows finally from Lemma 14.
⇐]: Suppose that there is a triple {x, y, z} ⊆ T that is not full at N . We show that there
is a non-dictatorial strategy-proof rule f with |Ω| > 2.
Step 1: We prove the statement if N ∩ {x, y, z} 6= ∅.
Suppose without loss of generality that x ∈ N and y < z. Consider any j ∈ N \ {x}.
First, if j ≤ y, then the rule f such that ΩA = x whenever x ∈ A, ΩA = y whenever
A∩{x, j} = {j}, and ΩA = z otherwise, has three alternatives in its range and is both non-
dictatorial and strategy-proof. Second, if j ≥ z, then the rule f such that ΩA = x whenever
x ∈ A, ΩA = y whenever A ∩ {x, j} = ∅, and ΩA = z otherwise, has three alternatives in
its range and is both non-dictatorial and strategy-proof. Third, if j ∈ (y, z), then the rule
f such that ΩA = x whenever x ∈ A, and ΩA = {y, z} otherwise, where GA(R) contains
all non-empty coalitions of 2NA\IA(R) for all R ∈ RA with x 6∈ A, has three alternatives in
its range and is both non-dictatorial and strategy-proof.
Step 2: We prove the statement if N ∩ {x, y, z} = ∅ and N 6⊂ (min{x, y, z},max{x, y, z}).
Suppose without loss of generality that x < y < z. Then, by assumption, there is an agent
i ∈ N such that i 6∈ [x, z]. We only show the case when i < x because the case when
i > z is similar. Consider any j ∈ N \ {i}. First, if j < y, then the rule f such that
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ΩA = x whenever i ∈ A, ΩA = y whenever A ∩ {i, j} = {j}, and ΩA = z otherwise, has
three alternatives in its range and is both non-dictatorial and strategy-proof. Second, if
j > z, then the rule f such that ΩA = x whenever i ∈ A, ΩA = y whenever A ∩ {i, j} = ∅
and ΩA = z otherwise, has three alternatives in its range and is both non-dictatorial and
strategy-proof. Third, if j ∈ (y, z), then the rule f such that ΩA = x whenever i ∈ A, and
ΩA = {y, z} otherwise, where GA(R) contains all non-empty coalitions of 2NA\IA(R) for all
R ∈ RA with i 6∈ A, has three alternatives in its range and is both non-dictatorial and
strategy-proof.
Proof of Proposition 9
Let Nl = {i ∈ N : i ≤ inf T}, Nh = {i ∈ N : i ≥ supT}, and Nc = N \ (Nl ∪ Nh).27 We
show that minT exists (the proof with maxT is similar). Suppose by contradiction that
minT does not exist. Consider a profile R ∈ RNl such that for all i ∈ Nc and all y ∈ T ,
with y > i, there is an alternative x ∈ T , with x ≤ i, such that xPi y. Since there is no
Pareto efficient alternative in this profile, it is not possible to construct a Pareto efficient
rule.
Proof of Theorem 3
We first start with a lemma.
Lemma 15 Suppose that f is strategy-proof and Pareto efficient. If N ⊂ (minT,maxT ),
then Ω∅ = {minT,maxT}.
Proof: Consider any two profiles R,R′ ∈ R∅ such that for all i ∈ N , minT Pi maxT
and maxT P ′i minT . Then, by Pareto efficiency, f(R) = minT and f(R
′) = maxT . Since
|Ω∅| ≤ 2 by Proposition 1, Ω∅ = {minT,maxT}. 
We are now ready to prove the theorem. Consider a set T such that |T | > 2 and both
minT and maxT exist. Then, there is an alternative y ∈ T \ {minT,maxT}.
⇐]: Suppose that at least one of the conditions of the theorem holds. We show that there
is a non-dictatorial, strategy-proof, and Pareto efficient rule f .
Step 1: We prove the statement if N 6⊂ (minT,maxT ).
27If inf T or supT does not exist, the corresponding sets are empty.
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Suppose that i ∈ N such that i 6∈ (minT,maxT ) and consider any j ∈ N \ {i}. Assume
without loss of generality that i ≤ minT . First, if j ∈ (minT, y], then the rule f such that
ΩA = maxT whenever A∩{i, j} = ∅, ΩA = minT whenever i ∈ A, and ΩA = y otherwise,
is non-dictatorial, strategy-proof, and Pareto efficient. Second, if j ∈ (y,maxT ), then the
rule f such that ΩA = maxT whenever i 6∈ A, ΩA = minT whenever A ∩ {i, j} = {i},
and ΩA = y otherwise, is non-dictatorial, strategy-proof, and Pareto efficient. Third, if
j ≤ minT , the rule f such that ΩA = maxT whenever A ∩ {i, j} = ∅, ΩA = minT
whenever {i, j} ⊆ A, and ΩA = y otherwise, is non-dictatorial, strategy-proof, and Pareto
efficient. Fourth, if j ≥ maxT , the rule f such that ΩA = maxT whenever A∩{i, j} = {j},
ΩA = minT whenever A∩{i, j} = {i}, and ΩA = y otherwise, is non-dictatorial, strategy-
proof, and Pareto efficient.
Step 2: We prove the statement if N ⊂ (minT,maxT ) and there are two agents i, j ∈ N
such that i ∈ T , and both max{x ∈ T : x ≤ j} and min{x ∈ T : x ≥ j} exist.
Consider the rule f such that ΩA = i whenever i ∈ A, ΩA = {max{x ∈ T : x ≤ j},min{x ∈
T : x ≥ j}} whenever A ∩ {i, j} = {j}, and ΩA = {minT,maxT} otherwise, where j is a
dictator at all ΩA such that |ΩA| = 2 (and choosing lA if j is indifferent between lA and
hA). This rule is non-dictatorial, strategy-proof, and Pareto efficient.
⇒]: Suppose that none of the conditions of the theorem holds. We show that there is
no non-dictatorial, strategy-proof, and Pareto efficient rule. Suppose by contradiction
that there is such a rule. We divide the proof into two steps. The first step reaches a
contradiction if neither the first condition (N 6⊂ (minT,maxT )) nor the first part of the
second condition (there is an agent i ∈ N such that i ∈ T ) is satisfied. That is, we
reach a contradiction if N ⊂ (minT,maxT ) and N ∩ T = ∅. The second step reaches a
contradiction when, although the first part of the second condition holds, neither the first
condition nor the second part of the second condition (there is an agent j ∈ N \ {i} such
that max{x ∈ T : x ≤ j} and min{x ∈ T : x ≥ j} exist) is satisfied. That is, we reach a
contradiction whenever N ⊂ (minT,maxT ), |N ∩ T | = 1,28 and for and for all j ∈ N \ T ,
max{x ∈ T : x ≤ j} or min{x ∈ T : x ≥ j} does not exist.
Step 1: We reach a contradiction if N ⊂ (minT,maxT ) and N ∩ T = ∅.
Since N ⊂ (minT,maxT ), we have by Lemma 15 that Ω∅ = {minT,maxT}. Consider
now a profile R ∈ RN such that for all i ∈ N , y Pi minT Pi maxT (note that y has
28Note that we restrict that only one agent is situated at a feasible point since if there are more than
one, the second part of the second condition will also be satisfied.
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been defined at the beginning of the proof as an alternative y ∈ T \ {minT,maxT}).
Then, f(R) 6∈ {minT,maxT} by Pareto efficiency. Thus, |Ω| > 2. Note also that since
N ⊂ (minT,maxT ) and {minT,maxT} ⊂ Ω, N ⊂ (min Ω,max Ω). Similarly, since
N ∩T = ∅ and Ω ⊆ T , N ∩Ω = ∅. Then, Ω is full at N . Finally, apply Lemma 14 to reach
a contradiction.
Step 2: We reach a contradiction if N ⊂ (minT,maxT ), |N∩T | = 1, and for all j ∈ N \T ,
max{x ∈ T : x ≤ j} or min{x ∈ T : x ≥ j} does not exist.
Let N ∩ T = {i}. Since N ⊂ (minT,maxT ), Ω∅ = {minT,maxT} by Lemma 15. Then,
N∅ = N .
Step 2.a: We show that for all S ⊂ N such that minN ∈ S, N ∩ [minS,maxS] = S and
maxS < i, ΩS = {minT,maxT}.
The proof is by induction on the size of S. Suppose first that |S| = 1, which implies
that S = {minN}. Assume by contradiction that ΩS 6= {minT,maxT}. Since N∅ = N ,
minN ∈ N∅. Given that minN = maxS < i and N ∩ T = {i}, minN 6∈ T . Apply
Proposition 4 (third point) to Ω∅ and ΩS to see that minN ∈ NS. The application of
Proposition 5 to Ω∅ and ΩS implies then that minN is a dictator at ΩS.
By assumption, either max{x ∈ T : x ≤ minN} or min{x ∈ T : x ≥ minN} does not
exist. If max{x ∈ T : x ≤ minN} does not exist, consider any z ∈ T ∩ (lS,minN) and
denote S∗ = N ∩ [z,minN ]. If min{x ∈ T : x ≥ minN} does not exist, consider any
z ∈ T ∩ (minN, hS) such that z < i and denote S∗ = N ∩ [minN, z]. We are going to
show that ΩS∗ = ΩS and that minN is a dictator at ΩS∗ . If max{x ∈ T : x ≤ minN}
does not exist, then S∗ = S. Consequently, ΩS∗ = ΩS and minN is a dictator at ΩS∗ .
If min{x ∈ T : x ≥ minN} does not exist, note that (a) minN ∈ NS \ (S∗ \ {minN})
because minN ∈ NS, (b) minN is a dictator at ΩS, (c) (S∗ \ {minN}) ∩ Ω = ∅ because
N ∩ T = {i}, Ω ⊆ T and it follows from z < i that i 6∈ S∗, and (d) (S∗ \ {minN}) ⊆ NS
because minN ∈ NS and z < hS. Then, it follows from Lemma 12 that ΩS∗ = ΩS and that
minN is a dictator at ΩS∗ .
29 Finally, consider a profile R ∈ RS∗ such that hS PminN lS
and z Pk hS for all k ∈ NS∗ . Observe that, for all l 6∈ NS∗ , z Pl hS because l ≥ hS > z and
Rl ∈ R−l . Then, since minN is a dictator at ΩS∗ , f(R) = hS, but z Pareto dominates hS.
This is a contradiction.
29Note that with respect to Lemma 12, the roles of A, B and i are played here by S, S∗ and minN ,
respectively. Observe also that [(S \ S∗) ∪ (S∗ \ S)] = (S∗ \ {minN}) = N ∩ (minN, z].
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Consider now any S ⊂ N such that |S| > 1, minN ∈ S, N ∩ [minS,maxS] = S, and
maxS < i. Suppose that for all S ′ ⊆ S such that minN ∈ S ′ and N∩[minS ′,maxS ′] = S ′,
ΩS′ = Ω∅, but, by contradiction, ΩS 6= {minT,maxT}. By the induction hypothesis
(setting S ′ = S \ {maxS}), ΩS\{maxS} = {minT,maxT}. Given that maxS < i and
N ∩ T = {i}, maxS 6∈ T . Apply Proposition 4 (third point) to ΩS\{maxS} and ΩS to see
that maxS ∈ NS. The application of Proposition 5 to ΩS\{maxS} and ΩS implies then that
maxS is a dictator at ΩS.
By assumption, either max{x ∈ T : x ≤ maxS} or min{x ∈ T : x ≥ maxS} does not
exist. If max{x ∈ T : x ≤ maxS} does not exist, consider any z ∈ T ∩ (lS,maxS) and
denote S∗ = S. If min{x ∈ T : x ≥ maxS} does not exist, consider any z ∈ T ∩(maxS, hS)
such that z < i and denote S∗ = N ∩ [minN, z]. We are going to show that ΩS∗ = ΩS and
that maxS is a dictator at ΩS∗ . If max{x ∈ T : x ≤ maxS} does not exist, then S∗ = S.
Consequently, ΩS∗ = ΩS and maxS is a dictator at ΩS∗ . If min{x ∈ T : x ≥ maxS} does
not exist, note that (a) maxS ∈ NS \ (S∗ \ S) because maxS ∈ NS ∩ S, (b) maxS is a
dictator at ΩS, (c) (S
∗ \S)∩Ω = ∅ because N ∩T = {i}, Ω ⊆ T , and it follows from z < i
that i 6∈ S∗, and (d) (S∗ \ S) ⊆ NS because maxS ∈ NS and z < hS. Then, it follows
from Lemma 12 that ΩS∗ = ΩS and that maxS is a dictator at ΩS∗ .
30 Consider finally a
profile R ∈ RS∗ such that hS PmaxS lS and z Pk hS for all k ∈ NS∗ . Observe that, for all
l 6∈ NS∗ , z Pl hS because l ≥ hS > z and Rl ∈ R−l . Then, since maxS is a dictator at ΩS∗ ,
f(R) = hS, but z Pareto dominates hS. This is a contradiction.
Step 2.b: We show that for all j ∈ N \ {i}, Ω{j} = {minT,maxT}.
Consider any j < i.31 Denote S = [minN, j] ∩ N . By Step 2.a, ΩS = {minT,maxT}.
If |S| = 1, then S = {j} and Ω{j} = {minT,maxT}. If |S| > 1, consider any agent
k ∈ S \ {j}. Since ΩS = {minT,maxT} and N ⊂ (minT,maxT ), k ∈ NS. Apply
Proposition 4 (third point) to ΩS\{k} and ΩS to see that ΩS\{k} = {minT,maxT}. If
|S \ {k}| = 1, then S \ {k} = {j} and, therefore, Ω{j} = {minT,maxT}. If |S \ {k}| > 1,
proceed iteratively in this way with all agents of S\{j} to arrive at Ω{j} = {minT,maxT}.
Step 2.c: We show that for all A ⊆ N \ {i}, ΩA = {minT,maxT}.
Consider any A ⊆ N \ {i}. Note that (a) for all j ∈ A, Ω{j} = Ω∅ by Step 2.b, (b) A ⊆ N∅
because it follows from Ω∅ = {minT,maxT} and N ⊂ (minT,maxT ) that N∅ = N , and
30Note that with respect to Lemma 12, the roles of A, B and i are played here by S, S∗ and maxS,
respectively. Observe also that [(S \ S∗) ∪ (S∗ \ S)] = (S∗ \ S) = N ∩ (maxS, z].
31If j > i, the proof is similar, but with an adapted version of Step 2.a that proves (in a similar way
to Step 2.a) that for all S ⊂ N such that maxN ∈ S, N ∩ [minS,maxS] = S and minS > i, then
ΩS = {minT,maxT}.
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(c) A ∩ Ω = ∅ because (N \ {i}) ∩ T = ∅, A ⊆ N \ {i}, and Ω ⊆ T . Then, it follows from
Lemma 9 that ΩA = Ω∅. Hence, ΩA = {minT,maxT}.
Step 2.d: We show that Ω{i} 6= {minT,maxT}.
Suppose by contradiction that Ω{i} = {minT,maxT}. We show that ΩA = {minT,maxT}
for all A ⊆ N by induction on the size of A. If |A| = 0, A = ∅ and we already know
that Ω∅ = {minT,maxT}. If |A| = 1 and A = {i}, then Ω{i} = {minT,maxT} by
assumption. If |A| = 1 and A 6= {i}, then ΩA = {minT,maxT} by Step 2.b. So, consider
any A ⊆ N such that |A| > 1 and suppose that for all B ⊂ A, ΩB = {minT,maxT},
but, by contradiction, ΩA 6= {minT,maxT}. If i 6∈ A, then ΩA = {minT,maxT} by
Step 2.c. Hence, i ∈ A. Consider any agent j ∈ A \ {i} and suppose without loss of
generality that j > i. By the induction hypothesis (setting B = A \ {j} and B = A \ {i}),
ΩA\{j} = ΩA\{i} = {minT,maxT}. Since N ∩ T = {i} and Ω ⊆ T , j 6∈ Ω. Also, since
ΩA\{j} = {minT,maxT} and N ⊂ (minT,maxT ), j ∈ NA\{j}. Apply then Proposition
4 (third point) to ΩA\{j} and ΩA to see that j ∈ NA. The application of Proposition 5
to ΩA\{j} and ΩA implies then that j is a dictator at ΩA and at ΩA\{j}. Since ΩA\{i} =
{minT,maxT} and N ⊂ (minT,maxT ), i ∈ NA\{i}. Apply then Proposition 4 (third
and fourth point) to ΩA\{i} and ΩA to see that lA ∈ [minT, i], hA ∈ [i,maxT ], and
hA ∈ {i,maxT} whenever lA = i.
Suppose first that lA < i. Since j ∈ NA and i < j, hA > i. Thus, i ∈ NA. Apply
Proposition 5 to ΩA\{i} and ΩA to see that i is a dictator at ΩA. This contradicts that j
is a dictator at ΩA. Suppose next that lA = i. Since j ∈ NA, hA = maxT . Therefore,
ΩA = {i,maxT}. Note that (a) j ∈ NA \ (NA \A) because j ∈ NA ∩A, (b) j is a dictator
at ΩA, (c) (NA \ A) ∩ Ω = ∅ because N ∩ T = {i}, Ω ⊆ T , and because it follows from
ΩA = {i,maxT} that i 6∈ NA, and (d) NA \ A ⊆ NA. It follows then from Lemma 12 that
ΩA∪NA = ΩA = {i,maxT} and that j is a dictator at ΩA∪NA .32 It can be shown in a similar
way that ΩA∪NA\{j} = ΩA\{j} = {minT,maxT} and that j is a dictator at ΩA∪NA\{j}.
We now show that ΩN = ΩA∪NA . If N = A∪NA, then ΩN = ΩA∪NA . If N 6= A∪NA, then
A ∪ NA ⊂ N . Consider any k ∈ N \ (NA ∪ A) and note that (a) j ∈ NA∪NA ∩ (A ∪ NA)
because j is a dictator at ΩA and at ΩA∪NA , (b) k 6∈ NA∪NA ∪ (A ∪ NA) by definition of
k and the fact that ΩA∪NA = ΩA, (c) j is a dictator at ΩA∪NA and (d) j ∈ NA∪NA∪{k}\{j}
because N ⊂ (minT,maxT ) and ΩA∪NA∪{k}\{j} = {minT,maxT}.33 Then, it follows from
32Note that with respect to Lemma 12, the roles of B and i are played here by A∪NA and j, respectively.
Observe also that [((A ∪NA) \A) ∪ (A \ (A ∪NA))] = NA \A.
33Suppose that ΩA∪NA∪{k}\{j} 6= {minT,maxT}. Since ΩA∪NA\{j} = {minT,maxT}, k ∈ NA∪NA\{j}.
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Lemma 10 that ΩA∪NA∪{k} = ΩA∪NA .
34 Proceeding iteratively in this way with all agents
of N \ (NA ∪ A) we arrive at ΩN = ΩA∪NA . Thus, ΩN = {i,maxT}. Let z ∈ T be
such that z ∈ (i, j) when max{x ∈ T : x ≤ j} does not exist and z ∈ (j,maxT ) when
min{x ∈ T : x ≥ j} does not exist. Consider a profile R ∈ RN such that for all k ∈ NN ,
z Pk maxT Pk i. Observe that, for all l 6∈ NN , z Pl maxT because l ≤ i < z < maxT and
Rl ∈ R+l . Then, HN(R) = NN . By Lemma 8, f(R) = maxT . This is a contradiction
because z Pareto dominates maxT .
We have thus shown that for all A ⊆ N , ΩA = {minT,maxT}. Consequently, ΩN =
{minT,maxT}. Consider a profile R ∈ RN such that for all i ∈ N , y Pi minT Pi maxT
(note that y has been defined at the beginning of the proof as an alternative y ∈ T \
{minT,maxT}). By Pareto efficiency, f(R) 6∈ {minT,maxT}, which is a contradiction.
Step 2.e: We show that Ω{i} = {i}.
Suppose by contradiction that Ω{i} 6= {i}. Since N∅ = N , i ∈ N∅. The application of
Proposition 4 (third and fourth point) to Ω∅ and Ω{i} gives us then three possibilities for
Ω{i}. First, if Ω{i} = {minT,maxT}, we reach a contradiction by Step 2.d. Second, if
Ω{i} ∈ {{i,maxT}, {minT, i}}, consider a profile R ∈ R∅ such that I∅(R) = I{i}(R) = ∅
and any preference R′i ∈ R+i . Then, by Proposition 3 (exactly the last point of Definition
1), G∅(R) 6= ∅. Consider a coalition B ⊆ N∅ such that B ∈ G∅(R) and observe that by
Proposition 8 (first or second point depending whether Ω{i} ∈ {minT, i} or {i,maxT}),
B ∩ N{i} ∩ {i} ∈ G{i}(R′i, R−i). Since B ∩ N{i} ∩ {i} = ∅, we have that ∅ ∈ G{i}(R′i, R−i).
Since I{i}(R
′
i, R−i) = ∅, this contradicts Proposition 3 (exactly the last point of Definition
1). Third, if Ω{i} = {l{i}, h{i}} 6= {minT,maxT}, with i ∈ N{i} ⊆ N∅, then note that (a)
(N \ {i}) ∩ Ω = ∅ because (N \ {i}) ∩ T = ∅ and Ω ⊆ T , and (b) i ∈ N{i} ⊆ N∅ = N
because N∅ = N . We can thus apply Lemma 13 to see that f is dictatorial, which is a
contradiction.
Step 2.f: We show that for all A ⊆ N , ΩA = {i} whenever i ∈ A.
Consider any A ⊆ N such that i ∈ A. The proof is by induction on the size of A. If
|A| = 1, the result follows from Step 2.e. So, consider now any A ⊆ N such that i ∈ A and
|A| > 1 and suppose that for all B ⊂ A, with i ∈ B, ΩB = {i}. Consider any j ∈ A \ {i}.
Given that k 6∈ T , we have by Proposition 4 (third point) that k ∈ NA∪NA∪{k}\{j}. By Proposition 5
applied to ΩA∪NA\{j} and ΩA∪NA∪{k}\{j}, k is a dictator at ΩA∪NA\{j}. This contradicts that j is a
dictator at ΩA∪NA\{j}.
34Note that with respect to Lemma 10, the roles of A, i and j are played here by A ∪ NA, j and k,
respectively.
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It follows from the induction hypothesis (by setting B = A\{j}) that ΩA\{j} = {i}. Apply
Proposition 4 (first or second point depending on whether or not j > i) to ΩA\{j} and ΩA
to see that lA and hA are both weakly between i and j. We also have by Step 2.c that
ΩA\{i} = {minT,maxT}. Then, since i ∈ NA\{i}, we can apply Proposition 4 (third and
fourth point) to ΩA\{i} and ΩA to obtain that lA ∈ [minT, i], hA ∈ [i,maxT ], and if i ∈ ΩA,
then ΩA = {{i}, {minT, i}, {i,maxT}}. Since N ⊂ (minT,maxT ), j 6∈ {minT,maxT}.
Then, the only possibility is lA = hA = {i}.
Step 2.g: We show that i is a dictator at ΩN\{i}.
By Step 2.c, ΩN\{i} = {minT,maxT}. Suppose by contradiction that i is not a dictator
at ΩN\{i}. Then, there exists a profile R ∈ RN\{i} , with i 6∈ IN\{i}(R), and a coalition
B ⊆ NN\{i}, with i 6∈ B, such that B ∈ GN\{i}(R) (the proof that it is not possible that
i ∈ B 6∈ GN\{i}(R) is similar). Then, since B ⊆ (N \{i})\IN\{i}(R), we have by Proposition
3 (exactly the third point of Definition 1) that (N \ {i}) \ IN\{i}(R) ∈ GN\{i}(R). Observe,
on the other hand, that by assumption, there is an alternative z ∈ T \ {minT,maxT, i}.
Assume that z > i (the proof when z < i is similar) and consider a profile R′ ∈ RN\{i}




j maxT for all j ∈ (N \ {i}) \ IN\{i}(R), and
maxT P ′i z P
′
i minT . Observe that for all k ∈ IN\{i}(R), z P ′k minT . By Proposition 3
(exactly the second point of Definition 1), GN\{i}(R′) = GN\{i}(R) and, thus, (N \ {i}) \
IN\{i}(R) ∈ GN\{i}(R′). Since LN\{i}(R′) = (N \ {i}) \ IN\{i}(R), f(R′) = minT , but z
Pareto dominates minT . This is a contradiction.
Step 2.h: We show that i is a dictator at ΩA for all A ⊆ N \ {i}.
Consider any A ⊆ N \ {i}. Note that (a) i ∈ NN\{i} \ ((N \ {i}) \ A) because it follows
from the fact that i is a dictator at ΩN\{i} by Step 2.g that i ∈ NN\{i}, (b) i is a dictator
at ΩN\{i} by Step 2.g, (c) ((N \ {i}) \ A) ∩ Ω = ∅ because N ∩ T = {i} and Ω ⊆ T , and
(d) (N \ {i}) \ A ⊆ NN\{i} because it follows from the fact that ΩN\{i} = {minT,maxT}
by Step 2.c and N ⊂ (minT,maxT ) that NN\{i} = N . Therefore, by Lemma 12, i is a
dictator at ΩA.
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Step 2.i: We reach a contradiction.
By Step 2.h, agent i is for all A ⊆ N \{i} a dictator at ΩA. This, together with the fact that
ΩA = {minT,maxT} for all A ⊆ N \ {i} by Step 2.c, implies that if i has single-dipped
preferences, she obtains one of her maximal alternatives. Given that, by Step 2.f, she
35Note that with respect to Lemma 12, the roles of A and B are played here by N\{i} and A, respectively.
Observe also that [((N \ {i}) \A) ∪ (A \ (N \ {i}))] = (N \ {i}) \A.
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also obtains her most preferred alternative (her own location) when she has single-peaked
preferences, the rule is dictatorial, being i the dictator. This is a contradiction.
Proof of Theorem 4
Let T be such that both minT and maxT exist and that N ∩ (minT,maxT ) = ∅. The
proof considers jointly the definition of the generalized median voter rules from footnote
13 and the extra condition for Pareto efficiency from footnote 14.
⇐]: Take any generalized median voter rule f . Since all generalized median voters rules
are strategy-proof on the domain of single-peaked preferences and since R is a subdomain
of the domain of single-peaked preferences, f is strategy-proof.
Suppose additionally that ΩNl = minT and ΩNh = maxT . We have to show that f is
Pareto efficient. Take any profile R ∈ RA. If A = Nl (respectively, A = Nh), all agents
prefer minT (respectively, maxT ) to any other alternative, and precisely this unanimously
best alternative is chosen. In all other cases, for all x, y ∈ T , there are two agents i, j ∈ N
such that xPi y and y Pj x. So, any alternative is Pareto efficient. This implies that the
outcome f(R) is Pareto efficient in these cases as well.
⇒]: Consider any strategy-proof rule f . We show that there is a function ω : 2N → T ,
with ω(A) = ΩA, satisfying the condition of the generalized median voter rules such that
for all A ⊆ N and all R ∈ RA, f(R) = ΩA. By strategy-proofness, f belongs to the family
characterized in Theorem 1. First, we prove that the range of ω is T instead of T 2. Suppose
otherwise, that is, there is a set A ⊆ N such that lA 6= hA. Since N∩(minT,maxT ) = ∅ by
assumption, NA = ∅. This contradicts Proposition 2. Second, the first point of Proposition
4 implies that for all S ⊂ N and all i ∈ N \ S, ω(S ∪ {i}) ≥ ω(S) whenever i ∈ Nh.
Similarly, the second point of Proposition 4 implies that for all S ⊂ N and all i ∈ N \ S,
ω(S ∪ {i}) ≤ ω(S) whenever i ∈ Nl. Then, f is a generalized median voter rule. Suppose
finally that f is also Pareto efficient. Then, observe that for any R ∈ RNl (respectively,
R ∈ RNh), minT (respectively, maxT ) Pareto dominates all other alternatives. Then,
ΩNl = minT and ΩNh = maxT .
Proof of Theorem 5
Let T be such that both minT and maxT exist and that N ⊂ T ∩ (minT,maxT ).
⇐] Consider any conditional two-step rule f . We show that f is strategy-proof, Pareto
efficient, and tops-only. Note that Ω∅ = {minT,maxT} and |ΩA| = 1 whenever A 6= ∅.
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First, we show that f is tops-only. Consider any R ∈ RA for some A ⊆ N . If A 6=
∅, |ΩA| = 1 and this outcome f(R) = ΩA depends on A, the locations of the agents
with single-peaked preferences. Since the top alternative of any agent with single-peaked
preferences is her location, the outcome of the rule in these profiles only depends on the
top alternatives of the agents with single-peaked preferences. Hence, f is tops-only in
these profiles. If, however, A = ∅, ΩA = {minT,maxT} and f(R) depends on the sets
{i ∈ N : minT ∈ t(Ri)} and {i ∈ N : minT = t(Ri)}. That is, it depends on the top
alternatives of all agents. Hence, f is tops-only in these profiles as well.
Next, we show that f is strategy-proof. To see that f is one of the rules defined in Corollary
1, define from ω the function ω∗ : 2N → T 2 in such a way that ω∗(A) = ω(A) whenever
A 6= ∅ and ω∗(∅) = {minT,maxT}. Then, ω∗ satisfies the properties of the function ω in
Corollary 1. Note that ω∗ describes the preselected alternatives in the first step of the rule.
Second, since |ω∗(A)| = 2 only if A = ∅, we have to define only the correspondence G∅. We
do that using G in the following way: for any R ∈ R∅ and any B ∈ 2N\I∅(R), B ∈ G∅(R)
whenever (B∪I∅(R), B) ∈ G. Observe then that the first two conditions of Definition 1 are
satisfied by construction, that the third and the fourth condition of Definition 1 are implied
by the monotonicity property of G, and that the last condition of Definition 1 is implied
by the efficiency condition of G. We can thus conclude that f is one of the rules defined
in Corollary 1. To further see that f satisfies Proposition 4, note on the one hand that if
A 6= ∅, then only the first and the second point of Proposition 4 apply. The monotonicity
property ensures that these two points are satisfied. On the other hand, if A = ∅, then
only the third and the fourth point of Proposition 4 apply. Since Ω{i} = i for all i ∈ N ,
these two points are also satisfied. We can thus conclude that f satisfies Proposition 4.
Finally, Propositions 5 to 8 never apply because there is no A ⊂ N and i ∈ N \ A such
that |ω∗(A)| = |ω∗(A ∪ {i})| = 2. Consequently, f belongs to the family characterized in
Theorem 1. Hence, it is strategy-proof.
Finally, we show that f is Pareto-efficient. Consider any R ∈ RA for some A ⊆ N . If A = ∅,
then f(R) ∈ {minT,maxT}. Suppose that f(R) = minT (the case when f(R) = maxT
is similar). Then, ({i ∈ N : minT ∈ t(Ri)}, {i ∈ N : t(Ri) = minT}) ∈ G. Then,
by the monotonicity and the efficiency conditions of G, we have that {i ∈ N : minT ∈
t(Ri)} = N or {i ∈ N : t(Ri) = minT} 6= ∅. In any case, minT is Pareto efficient. If
A 6= ∅, then f(R) ∈ [minA,maxA]. Observe that for all x, y, z, w ∈ T such that x, y ∈
[minA,maxA], with x < y, z < minA and w > maxA, we have that xPminA y PminAw
and y PmaxA xPmaxA z. Then, no alternative inside the interval [minA,maxA] is Pareto
dominated by any other alternative. This guarantees that any choice in this interval is
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Pareto efficient.
⇒]: Consider any tops-only, strategy-proof and Pareto efficient rule f . We show that f is
a conditional two-step rule.
By strategy-proofness, the rule belongs to the family of Theorem 1. By Lemma 15, Ω∅ =
{minT,maxT}.
Step 1: We prove that for all A ⊆ N such that |ΩA| = 2, ΩA = {minT,maxT}.
Consider any A ⊆ N such that |ΩA| = 2. Suppose by contradiction that lA 6= minT or
hA 6= maxT . Let lA 6= minT (the proof when hA 6= maxT is similar and thus omitted).
Since lA ∈ ΩA, there is a profile R ∈ RA such that f(R) = lA. Consider now the profile
R′ ∈ RA such that for all i ∈ N , t(R′i) = t(Ri), and HA(R′) = NA.
We show that such a profile R′ exists. First, consider any i ∈ NA∩A. Then, for all R̄i ∈ R+i ,
t(R̄i) = t(Ri) = i 6∈ ΩA. Hence, there is a preference R′i ∈ R+i such that hA P ′i lA. Second,
consider any j ∈ NA ∩ (N \ A). If t(Rj) = maxT , then there is a preference R′j ∈ R−j




j lA. If, on the other hand, t(Rj) = minT ,
then there is a preference R′j ∈ R−j with t(R′j) = minT such that minT P ′j hA P ′j lA (this
is because lA > minT by assumption). Finally, if t(Rj) = {minT,maxT}, then there is
a preference R′j ∈ R−j with t(R′j) = {minT,maxT} such that minT R′j hA P ′j lA (this is
again because lA > minT by assumption). Consequently, there is a profile R
′ ∈ RA such
that for all i ∈ N , t(R′i) = t(Ri), and HA(R′) = NA.
Next, apply tops-onlyness to obtain that f(R′) = f(R) = lA. Then, ∅ ∈ GA(R′) and
IA(R
′) = ∅, which contradicts Proposition 3 (exactly the last point of Definition 1).
Step 2: We prove that if there is an agent i ∈ N such that Ω{i} 6= {minT,maxT}, then
Ω{i} = i.
Consider any i ∈ N such that Ω{i} 6= {minT,maxT}. Then, by Step 1, |Ω{i}| = 1. Since
N ⊂ (minT,maxT ) and Ω∅ = {minT,maxT}, i ∈ N∅. Apply Proposition 4 (third point)
to Ω∅ and Ω{i} to see that Ω{i} = i. This concludes Step 2.
Let D = {i ∈ N : Ω{i} = i}.
Step 3: We prove that if A ∩D = ∅, then ΩA = {minT,maxT}.
Consider any A ⊆ N such that A ∩ D = ∅. The proof is by induction on the size of
A. Suppose that |A| ≤ 1. If |A| = 0, we already know that Ω∅ = {minT,maxT}. If
|A| = 1, then, by the definition of the set D, ΩA = Ω∅. So, consider now any A ⊆ N such
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that A ∩ D = ∅ and |A| > 1. Suppose that for all B ⊂ A, ΩB = {minT,maxT}, but,
by contradiction, ΩA 6= {minT,maxT}. Then, by Step 1, |ΩA| = 1. Consider any two
agents i, j ∈ A. By setting B = A \ {i} and, alternatively, B = A \ {j}, it follows from the
induction hypothesis that ΩA\{i} = ΩA\{j} = {minT,maxT}. Thus, ΩA\{i} 6= ΩA 6= ΩA\{j}.
Since N ⊂ (minT,maxT ), we have that i, j ∈ N∅ = NA\{i} = NA\{j}. Apply Proposition
4 (third point) on the one hand to ΩA\{i} and ΩA and, on the other hand, to ΩA\{j} and
ΩA in order to see that ΩA = i and ΩA = j. This is a contradiction.
Step 4: We prove that D = N .
Suppose by contradiction that D ⊂ N . Then, by Step 3, ΩN\D = {minT,maxT}. Let
R,R′ ∈ RN\D be such that for all i ∈ D, t(Ri) = t(R′i) = {minT,maxT}, while for
all j ∈ N \ D, minT Pj maxT and maxT P ′j minT . By tops-onliness, f(R) = f(R′).
If f(R) = f(R′) = minT , this violates Pareto efficiency since maxT Pareto dominates
minT at R′. If f(R) = f(R′) = maxT , this violates Pareto efficiency since minT Pareto
dominates maxT at R.
Step 5: We prove that if A 6= ∅, then |ΩA| = 1 and ΩA ∈ [minA,maxA].
The proof proceeds by induction on the size of A. If |A| = 1, the result follows from Step
4 and the definition of the set D. Suppose now that |A| > 1. The induction hypothesis
states that for all B ⊂ A, with B 6= ∅, |ΩB| = 1 and ΩB ∈ [minB,maxB]. Consider any
j ∈ A. By setting B = A \ {j}, it follows from the induction hypothesis that |ΩA\{j}| = 1
and ΩA\{j} ∈ [min(A \ {j}),max(A \ {j})]. Since A \ {j} ⊂ A, we have that ΩA\{j} ∈
[minA,maxA]. Then, applying Proposition 4 (third point) to ΩA\{j} and ΩA, we obtain
that lA is weakly between lA\{j} and j. Given that lA\{j} ≥ minA and minA > minT , we
have that lA\{j} > minT and, thus, ΩA 6= {minT,maxT}. Then, by Step 1 we have that
|ΩA| = 1. Since j, lA\{j} ∈ [minA,maxA], we have that lA ∈ [minA,maxA] and, thus,
ΩA ∈ [minA,maxA].
Step 6: We prove that the rule is a conditional two-step rule.
By Step 1, Ω∅ = {minT,maxT} and, by Step 5, |ΩA| = 1, where ΩA ∈ [minA,maxA],
whenever A 6= ∅.
Consider any A ⊆ N . First, if A 6= ∅, consider a function ω : 2N \∅ → (minT,maxT ) such
that for all A ⊆ N with A 6= ∅, ω(A) = ΩA. By Proposition 4 (first and second point),
ω is monotone. Second, if A = ∅, then N∅ = N . By Proposition 3 (exactly by Definition
1) we have for all R ∈ R∅ that f(R) = minT whenever L∅(R) = {i ∈ N : t(Ri) =




i) for all i ∈ N , f(R′) = f(R). Thus, we can fix G∅(R′) = G∅(R). That is,
the l∅–decisive sets depend only on the set of agents indifferent between l∅ = minT and
h∅ = maxT and not on their preferences. Consequently, the second point of Definition 1
becomes now the following stronger condition: for all R′ ∈ R∅ such that I∅(R) = I∅(R′),
G∅(R) = G∅(R′). So, the choice at any profile R ∈ R∅ between minT and maxT depends
only on L∅(R) and I∅(R). Then, we can define, using the correspondence G∅, a set of pairs
of coalitions G ⊆ 2N × 2N in the following way: G = {(A,B) ∈ 2N × 2N : there existsR ∈
R∅ such thatB ∈ G∅(R) and I∅(R) = A \ B} = {(A,B) ∈ 2N × 2N : there existsR ∈
R∅ such that minT ∈ t(Ri) for all i ∈ A, t(Rj) = minT for all j ∈ B, and f(R) = minT}.
Next, we have to see how the other conditions on G∅ translate to G. The third point
of Definition 1 implies that if (A,B) ∈ G and B ⊂ B′, then (A,B′) ∈ G. The first
part of the fourth point of Definition 1 implies that if (A,B′) 6∈ G and B ⊂ B′, then
(A ∪ (B′ \ B), B) 6∈ G. The second part of the fourth point of Definition 1 implies that
if (A,B) ∈ G and A ⊂ A′, then (A′, B) ∈ G. Therefore, the third and the fourth point
of Definition 1 imply that G is monotone. By Pareto efficiency, we have the efficiency
condition of G: (N,B) ∈ G for all B 6= ∅ and (A, ∅) 6∈ G for all A 6= N . Finally, the
last point of Definition 1 implies that (∅, ∅) 6∈ G and that there exists B ⊆ N such that
(B,B) ∈ G. These conditions are always satisfied because G is efficient.
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